page 1 Friday, 24th October 2008 (10.37 am) MR MARTIN: My Lord, the next witness and first witness this morning is Mr Alan David Elliott who has returned to speak to matters relevant to Phase 2. ALAN DAVID ELLIOTT (called) Examined by MR MARTIN Q. Good morning, Mr Elliott. A. Morning. Q. You should have available for the purposes of the questions I am going to ask, please, a copy of your supplementary statement which I think is just a short covering statement, as it were? A. I do. Q. The document which is headed, "Johnston Oils request for information from Johnston Oils for the purposes of Phase 2 of the Inquiry", where you have helpfully highlighted the questions that were asked and then provided answers. I just want to ask you a number of points about that. You should also have available to you a copy of Mr Sylvester-Evans' report containing his recommendations, which begins at page 9674? A. I do. Q. What I intend to do is to go through the J Gas answers to the questions and ask you about various matters and page 2 then I will ask you about Mr Sylvester-Evans' recommendations. So as we see from the supplementary statement your full name is Alan David Elliott, you were a director at Johnston Oils Limited and we are aware of your background in the company. Just as a matter of clarification are you currently Managing Director of J Gas? A. Yes. Q. Which is presumably a subsidiary of Johnston Oils. A. It is. Q. If you could turn then to first just briefly to Mr Sylvester-Evans' report, please, at paragraph 2.3.2. If I could just read this paragraph to you: "For most bulk LPG users the supply of LPG is not the focus of their business but a utility supply. Buried pipework can just be out of sight and out of mind. Also unlike the natural gas supply where the service pipework and primary meter is owned and is the responsibility of the gas supplier, this is often not the case with LPG facilities at industrial and commercial sites. This can lead to an incorrect assumption." Just stopping there, is there anything in these sentences with which you would disagree? page 3 A. No. Q. Do you accept that what Mr Sylvester-Evans has done in that paragraph is, in a sense, to highlight the problem which the events with which this Inquiry is concerned have brought to light, namely the out of sight out of mind concept for customers who use LPG? A. Yes. Q. Could you then go, please, to the request for information document and if I could just ask you to look at a number of matters. I would like first to look at what is question 12, which I have on page 2 of the document. This is a question about what is the status of UKLPG from Johnston Oils' view point. There are subsequent questions from UKLPG and Codes of Practice and so on. I just want to ask you a general question which I think will cover quite a lot of things that are said later. As far as J Gas is concerned, can the requirement of a UKLPG Code of Conduct be prescriptive; that is to say can they have the effect of making sure J Gas can do something? A. In our opinion, yes. Q. Is that because as a trade association in which you personally have participated and the company clearly is a member, along with other LPG suppliers, you can by page 4 virtue of your membership be required to adhere to prescriptive requirements in a Code of Conduct and presumably -- A. That's correct, yes. Q. -- if you fail to do so there would be a sanction by way of your ownership of the Association? A. I presume so. I don't know the articles in full, to be honest. THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Martin, forgive me for interrupting you but Mr Elliott is going to be referring to Mr Sylvester-Evans' report and I have made arrangements now for copies to be made of that report for the benefit of the families because otherwise they may be at a disadvantage in listening to this evidence. So that is being got for you at the moment, ladies. I hope that will help you. MR MARTIN: I am much obliged, my Lord. I had not quite appreciated it was not available and other than the question I have just asked I will not be looking at the report again for a little while. So that should give time. Thank you very much for that. Mr Betts in his evidence on behalf of Calor -- I do not know if you heard any of that evidence and, if so, how much of it -- but he did describe and I do not think there is any issue about this that in practical terms page 5 UKLPG codes can provide prescriptive requirements and I think siting of the tank was one of the particular examples he gives, so you would say as another member of the Association exactly the same thing? A. Exactly. Q. Thank you very much. Can you go, please, to page 4. In the paragraph which is headed, letter (a) "Bulk vessel installation", you set out the position as it was in May 2004: "Johnston Oils acted in accordance with the then Code of Practice at fixed installations, the objective of the code has been to provide guidance for those involved in the safe practice of storing and handling LPG in bulk fixed installations. Johnston oil's understanding is that this question refers to a like-for-like exchange of vessel, the procedures of which were detailed in evidence heard at stage 1", and that was the evidence of Mr Inglis? A. That's correct. Q. As I recall that evidence, and please correct me if I am wrong, Mr Elliott, what he did in accordance with the code that existed in 1998, and it was the same I think in May 2004, was that at vessel exchange he carried out visual examination of the riser pipework in the vicinity of the tank and he then carried out, once installed, page 6 tightness or soundness tests? A. That's correct. Q. That was the accepted practice at that time? A. Yes, in a like-for-like exchange, yes. Q. In a like-for-like exchange, exactly. In item 2, that is to say item 2 of the answer to the reference to bulk vessel installation you say: "As now, no change." Can we just confirm that as at 2008 what I have just sought to describe is exactly the same as would have been done in 2004 and indeed back in 1998? A. Certainly that was the case in 1998 and 2004, but now basically from 2005 when we became aware that the reason for the incident was corroded pipe we carry out a site survey to ascertain if there were steel risers or not. Q. I appreciate what you just said because I had a little difficulty understanding the second answer because when I read later in the statement as I understand it you do carry out more of an examination and in effect a risk assessment of an installation that J Gas has taken -- well, is going to be supplying gas into. A. That's correct. Q. So if the implication was that it is the same as of now, that is not quite right? A. No. page 7 Q. Then new pipework installation which you say on the same page, you say: "As at 2004 the requirement of Johnston Oils to carry out new pipework installations was as follows: if Johnston Oils was requested to carry out new pipework installation for a customer, it would carry out that work in accordance with the guidelines published in Code of Practice 22, 2002 edition." Without going into the details of that, what qualification would the fitter who did the work have to have so far as J Gas was concerned in order to comply with the requirements of the Code of Practice? A. Many, many qualifications. They would need have regarding the installation of vessel they call it ves 1 and ves 2. If he is doing electrofusion pipework he needs a certificate for that. There's many qualifications -- a list. Q. Are these qualifications issued by CORGI about which we have heard or the accredited certification scheme? A. Some of there are. Some of them are by CORGI. Some of them are our own in-house certification, to be honest, in-house training. Q. Assuming an installation which is effectively the same as one for domestic premises, which of course we know is covered by the GSIUR, in practical terms would the page 8 fitter working on an industrial installation installing new pipework be any differently qualified to the one who would work on the domestic installation? A. Not particularly. The only difference would be if the phrase -- if it was a vapour or liquid there may be some need for higher qualifications for working on liquid but generally it would be the same. Q. I think either you or Mr Shuttleworth from UKLPG makes that point that the GSIUR, which of course apply by and large to domestic premises because of the nature of domestic LPG installations which are all low pressure 37 mbargs then the LPG is in vapour phase in the pipe. That may be the same at the industrial installations where it is a lower pressure system but the point that you are making, I think he also makes, is that there may be industrial situations wherein the pipe the LPG is in the liquid phase -- A. Liquid phase. Q. -- and that raises slightly different considerations. A. Yes, it does. Q. Thank you. Item C -- sorry, I should just ask you to confirm that number 2 under new pipework installation, "As now, no change", is that one correct, there has not been any change about the installation of pipework since 2001? page 9 A. Still Code of Practice 22. Q. The next heading is, "See inspection of and maintenance of existing pipework conveying vapour or liquid and being above ground or buried." You say, J Gas say: "As at May 2004 in relation to existing customers Johnston Oils carried out an annual inspection of its bulk vessels and associated pipework up to the point of the first stage regulator. All pipework downstream of the first stage regulator was in the ownership of the customer and the responsibility for its maintenance and inspection rested with the customer, whether that pipework was above ground or buried." Just stopping at point -- and again you touch on this later, Mr Elliott, but it is helpful if we can deal with it now -- as I recall the evidence that I think you gave and also consistent with the evidence of Mr Inglis at Phase 1 of the Inquiry is that the J Gas ownership situation in terms of its contracts is that J Gas takes responsibility for the vessel, the vapour offtake valve and whatever else exists down to the stage of the first stage regulator? A. That's correct. Q. I have to confess that until we came to Phase 2, I rather assumed that was the regular position and indeed page 10 I will be discussing it with Mr Shuttleworth because I think UKLPG tend to give the impression it was a regular situation. What we heard yesterday from Mr Betts of Calor, and I don't know if you were present -- A. I was. Q. Good. He gave a description by reference to this tank here. The Calor position, under its modern contract at least -- I think he said, as far as he was aware, it had always been the same -- was that Calor take responsibility only for the vessel and the vapour offtake valve and everything else is the customer's. If we were to take the model in front of us, the J Gas situation would clearly be different in terms of legal responsibility. The first question is -- obviously this is just an example installation, it is not a model of everyone, but would the J Gas modern installation physically be any different to the one we see in front of us in terms of the items along the pipework beginning at the vapour offtake valve? A. No. We've actually the same except the overpressure/under pressure, which is the one with the red cap would be on the lifting lug of the tank. Q. I am sorry, I did not quite catch that? A. The one with the red cap, that would be on the lifting page 11 lug where the pipework is bolted to. Q. It may be helpful to his Lordship if you would not mind standing up and pointing to exactly what you can see. Because I can see two red things from my position. A. Sorry, this one here (indicated) ... so the first stage regulator would still be in here but there would be a pipe coming down and then along to here and then this regulator would be actually on here. (Indicated) THE CHAIRMAN: That is the second stage regulator. A. That's the second stage regulator, yes. MR MARTIN: So that is no doubt just a different technique. There is no significance in the consequence of that because of course by that stage, even in a J Gas situation, it is the customer's responsibility. A. That's right. Q. And the first stage regulator might be closer or slightly further aware from the vapour offtake valve depending on the circumstances? A. Our vessels are differently valved from Calor's. We don't have a multi-valve system. THE CHAIRMAN: Did you have examples of cases where the second stage regulator was further downstream away from the tank? A. Yes, you would have. THE CHAIRMAN: From the point of view of your responsibility page 12 that would not matter at all; you saw the dividing line and the first stage? A. Yes. MR MARTIN: Thank you very much. Given, Mr Elliott, that not least because of the way that Mr Sylvester-Evans described it as I referred to you a few moments ago, and Mr Betts, to be fair to him, recognised that one of the problems was what he called, I think quite reasonably, an ambiguity, the very fact that you as a responsible supply company and Calor as another responsible supply company have a different arrangement as far as ownership are concerned about which you were not aware by itself suggests that it needs to be clarified and perhaps made consistent because of course what I put to Mr Betts was the fact that in a situation where a tank exchange was taking place and, for example, tank work that we see in front of us, if the tank disconnection point, I assume, was at the outlet of the vapour offtake valve, if it was a like-for-like -- A. Yes. Q. -- then of course if the previous supplier had been J Gas, J Gas would actually own potentially the short but maybe a longer length of pipe to the first stage regulator? page 13 A. It has actually happened where exchanges have taken place and the outgoing supplier takes the regulator with them. Q. Actually, I was going to ask you about examples. Of course if the outgoing supplier takes the regulator with them in a sense the problem solves itself because one way or another the new supplier has to put it back. But what I was thinking more was the purely legal responsibility issue: if Calor took responsibility only to the vapour offtake valve, if the pipework thereafter had been left and was satisfactory, J Gas in your situation would presumably somehow arguably technically still be responsible for the bit of pipework to the first stage regulator and then the customer would somehow either have to take over J Gas' responsibility or there would be an uncertainty? A. Very much an uncertainty. Q. I think you agreed just a moment ago, Mr Elliott, the fact is this Inquiry really ought to try and think about ways of sorting out that potential uncertainty? A. Yes. Q. It is not very difficult from your point of view, I take it? A. I don't think so. Q. Just following on from the paragraph that I had already page 14 read to you at the top of what I have as page 5 of the response to questions, just beginning at the end of the second line: "The only circumstances in which Johnston Oils was required to test existing pipework downstream of the first stage regulator would be either for a like-for-like exchange or on any occasion where, for whatever reason, the system had been broken into." That again, as you have just said there, is consistent with Mr Inglis' evidence. Then you say: "As now in terms of what is required of Johnston Oils under the Code of Practice there has been no change." I think again that is strictly correct. The Code of Practice has not actually changed but the fact is Johnston Oils has changed its practice. A. Yes, that's correct. Q. Because you would make your assessment in a situation where you were taking over an installation even although there was no evidence that the system had been broken into. Is that right? A. That's right. Q. Then there are questions about the Codes of Practice. Perhaps I do not need to labour those. page 15 Could you go, please, to page 6. In the second -- well, perhaps I will read the first paragraph because this is the current procedures and policies of J Gas. The first paragraph: "In these circumstances [that is under the Code of Practice] the procedures and policies followed for the examination of above ground pipework and buried pipework would be no different to that which occurred in practice in 2004." That is just reaffirmation that the code has remained the same? A. That's correct. Q. You then say: "In relation to an installation, the standard and design of which is unknown, Johnston Oils current procedures and policies are as follows: a site survey is conducted with particular reference to existing pipework and any evidence of buried steel pipework is highlighted and suggested remedial action proposed. A risk assessment and site survey is conducted. In the event that the customer is not prepared to accept Johnston Oils' recommendations for remedial action, the exchange would not take place." I assume that remedial action might be in some circumstances the customer being advised to consider page 16 replacement pipework because the age of the -- if it were buried metallic pipework, was such to give rise to uncertainty but it's continuing integrity? A. Exactly, it's not known: so that's what we would suggest. Q. I do not in any sense mean to minimise what is said in this paragraph, Mr Elliott, but what is described there appears to me to be an entirely straightforward response to the events which have been revealed by what happened on 11th May 2004 and things that a responsible supplier can easily do to try and avoid the events which occurred on that day? A. Exactly. Q. Has the company found any particular difficulty or resistance on the part of those who wish to transfer to J Gas when J Gas has said, "Well, we are going to carry out this assessment and you might have to do something"? A. None, none whatsoever, when you explain the reasons for it, they fully accept it. Q. It is obviously in the customer's interest also not to have a potentially decaying pipework, never mind danger to life, there may be danger to property or interruption of the process? A. Yes. Q. Have you any notion of how many times since it was page 17 introduced this procedure has been carried out at an exchange of supplier? A. I would say in probably half a dozen. Q. How many new suppliers -- and I recognise as I ask this question it may be commercially confidential so I will accept that -- can you give the Inquiry of how many new customers J Gas will take on every month or every year or whatever? A. Commercially and domestic or just ...? Q. I was thinking of both, yes. As I say, if you do not want to give commercial information in front of a competitor, I am happy to accept that but it would be helpful to have an idea just to gauge the scale of what is happening? A. A couple of hundred at least. Q. If there were pipework in a basement because obviously your examination would reveal that as well as the fact it might be underground, what would be the recommendation of J Gas to the customer? A. As far as internal pipework is concerned we would suggest they contact a CORGI registered engineer to come and do an assessment on the internal pipework. Q. And you would not supply until that? A. Until we had proof that that had actually been remedied. Q. Of course, the fact that the engineer is CORGI page 18 registered is the assurance for you that it has been looked at? A. Yes. Q. What, if any, record is kept of what has been done in the course of this survey up to the point where you were satisfied and the supply begins. A. We would have the initial site survey in the letter that we'd send and we would send that by registered letter, and keep a copy of it and wait until they come back to us with the outcome. Q. So do I understand that you actually send the customer a copy of the survey? A. Yes. Q. And you also keep it too? A. Yes. Q. So if, as you will have heard the evidence of Mr Sylvester-Evans suggests, a safety dossier approach, would it be any difficulty for J Gas to provide what you have just described to the customer to be part of that safety dossier? A. None, fairly easy. Q. At the bottom of page 6 you say in answer to a question about codes of practice representing minimum standards you say: "Johnston Oils agree that the LPGA Codes of Practice page 19 represent minimum standards which LPG suppliers should meet. These standards are supplemented with section 2 of Johnston Oils own engineering technical file", and so on. Is that, in effect, what you just said, that the Code of Practice has not changed between 2004 and now and Johnston Oils' procedure has changed, as you have just explained, do you regard yourselves as doing something beyond what the code actually requires at the moment? A. At this moment, yes, we do. Q. I take it you would have no difficulty if the code were to come into line with the additional steps that J Gas take? A. No. Q. Then in the tables on page 7 and 8 these are presumably just a description of what the assessment leads to in terms of recommendations to the clients. So that if the assessment finds mild steel blue or red band pipe, which I take it judging from the scale of this table is the most likely to be at risk of significant corrosion, it then says: "It does not matter if corrosion protected, it does not matter of the location, action to be taken remove from service as soon as possible. If required fit page 20 temporary supply." That is the most extreme situation where I assume you say to the client, "Look, I am sorry until you have, in effect, bypassed the pipework in question, we cannot, J Gas cannot provide you with a supply"? A. That's correct. Q. Then on page 9 you set out the notes under this table. I wonder if you can help me with an acronym I am not familiar with OPSO -- it says: "Pipework should be protected with OPSO", and then I think sixth bullet points talks about: "OPSO protection to pipework downstream of the first stage regulator must be provided at the earliest convenient opportunity." What is OPSO? A. A protection device for PE pipe to stop PE pipe bursting. It's basically, if the first stage regulator was to fail, you could have full tank pressure going down the line and this will stop this. It would sense it and stop it. Q. So it's related to PE pipe? A. PE pipe, yes, to protect PE pipe. Q. So it is not directly relevant to our purposes. Perhaps my next question then is inappropriate because in the sixth bullet point it says: page 21 "OPSO protection to pipework downstream of a first stage regulator must be provided at the earliest convenient opportunity or fitted at ten years." I was going to ask you about the significance of the ten years in the context of potential steel corrosion, but I am assuming it is not relevant to that, it is because of the -- A. No, the ten year test -- Q. -- ten year inspection required under the regulations of the tank. In the last bullet point it says: "Pipework in the opinion of the engineer that exceeds 20 years life may at his discretion advise for this to be renewed, particularly where service conditions operate at 0.5 barg and is a metallic construction." Why is 20 years the period stated in that bullet point? A. We've been in business for 23 years and we know that at the start, when we were starting installing LPG vessels, there was metallic pipe used in the risers so at that 20-year stage that's when we want to remove it. Q. So is this, in effect, a way of trying to take out of service the metallic pipe -- A. Altogether. page 22 Q. -- perhaps with the earliest being the priority? A. Yes. Q. The question at the bottom of page 9: "Does Johnston Oils consider UKLPG to be a satisfactory method of setting and managing standards?" The answer is: "In general terms Johnston Oils does consider UKLPG to be a satisfactory method of setting and managing standards. However, it is submitted that there is a greater need for the end user/customer to be aware of their duties, responsibilities and risks of LPG ..." Of course it is perfectly obvious that the gas supply companies who are members of UKLPG and have participated in the formation of the codes, they obviously are aware of what is at risk and what might be done about it. The customer of course is not a member of UKLPG and we know from the list of those who were on the board of UKLPG, which I shall be discussing with the next witness, there is not any customer representative, if you like. That probably makes perfect sense because customers are a diverse group. In principle, how do you think UKLPG, as the trade association, should bring best it can to the attention of customers their responsibilities for the pipework? A. I think not just UKLPG but along with the HSE there page 23 should be some form of campaign, even though in 2006 we had the leaflet that was produced between the two groups but I think some form of technical memorandum or note we could send out to customers, all gas companies could send out to their customers, highlighting the responsibilities that they have. Q. You see I had a discussion, which I hope you may have heard, with Mr Betts yesterday about the Calor contractual terms which, as it would appear, are perfectly straightforward for the customer who chooses to pay attention to them and leaflets have been sent out and perhaps a disappointing response to those. The potential reality, Mr Elliott, is that however you try to inform people, whether in contracts or by leafleting or whatever else it may be, no doubt websites and all sorts of other things, the reality may be that customers are simply not paying enough attention. Has J Gas given any consideration to the sort of features that I discussed with Mr Betts yesterday which would involve, for example, a notice on the tank or on the cover identifying where the responsibilities lay for anyone who chose to come up to the tank? A. No, we haven't. I heard your suggestion yesterday. It's probably a very good idea. Q. Also -- there is nothing prescriptive about these -- page 24 perhaps the painting of the pipework in particular colours to distinguish responsibility and we also know that within industrial premises labels are put on pipework saying "propane" or whatever, again so that anyone immediately knows what it is. These sort of things could be done, could they not? A. I think, in general, I think, as a supplier and a customer, we need to raise awareness and make sure -- I think, Mr Sylvester-Evans' report and the safety dossier would certainly help that. Q. Again of course the safety dossier is in a drawer perhaps available but not beside the tank? A. But I think at least if the customer has a safety dossier and we know the customer has a safety dossier then we both -- at least someone -- it's not fallen between two stones. I think it's important. Q. But in practical terms notices or painted pipework is not going to cause any particular difficulty if these were part of a number of steps that were taken? A. No. Q. 22: you are asked about Johnston Oils' perspective of the difference between a Code of Practice and an approved Code of Practice. I think you touch on the difference later. An approved Code of Practice is of course one approve by the Health & Safety Executive. I page 25 understand and I think you confirm as a matter of practice these are not issued other than when they are codes of practice for the implementation of legislation for which the HSE has a direct responsibility? A. Yes. Q. What you do have, and there are examples here, is of as it were an endorsement and a preference by the Health & Safety Executive of an industry Code of Practice. Is the reason why J Gas do not actually see any particular difference between an approved code of practice and a code of practice in terms of its effect because, as we have already discussed, through membership of UKLPG a code of practice issued by them is, in effect, mandatory on the member supply company? A. That and the fact that they are endorsed by HSE. Q. So that the approval by itself, because it is still subject to the caveat you have to apply to the law, does not actually add anything; is that a fair way of -- A. Yes, that's fair. Q. It is also, I assume, fair to infer J Gas would not regard it any less important to comply with a UKLPG code of practice just because it had not been approved? A. That's correct. Q. In paragraph 23 you are asked: page 26 "What approach is practicable to existing LPG installations in terms of amendments and changes to standards?" In the second sentence beginning on the third line you say: "However, any changes to codes of practice do not apply retrospectively and it is difficult to envisage a situation where retrospective application could be applied or managed appropriately." I would just like to try and understand what you are saying there. It is not an unknown concept that you cannot apply regulations retrospectively, but in practical terms if you introduce a Code of Practice for existing installations so that something is done to assess that installation at some point in the future, perhaps at the next installation, next tank exchange or whatever, it is not really retrospective and it can be effective, can it not? A. No, it would be -- I think what we are getting at there is you can't really apply it retrospectively but you certainly could come up with some form of new code. Q. In the middle of the page under question 24 you refer to paragraph 2(a) of the J Gas general conditions where it is stated: "All tanks, regulators up to and including the first page 27 stage regulator shall remain the property of J Gas and can only be filled and maintained by J Gas." That is what we talked about earlier. Has that always been the position of J Gas throughout its period of business? A. Yes, it has. Q. I take it you have no intention of changing, notwithstanding what you heard yesterday? A. No. Q. Do you happen to know within the industry whether there is, apart from obviously Calor's position, whether there is any difference of approach on the ownership up to the first stage regulator? A. No. The only one I'm aware of is metered estates, domestic metered estates, where I believe some suppliers own the infrastructure. Q. Yes, because of the particular arrangements for metering? A. Yes. Q. But in general terms on a single vessel installation -- A. Single vessel, up to the first stage regulator. Q. That would tend to be the usual -- A. My understanding is, yes. Q. At the top of page 12, you are asked about the advantages and disadvantages of each situation, what page 28 alternatives might there be and what would their advantages and disadvantages be. This is the extent of ownership by the supplier issue. You refer to Mr Sylvester-Evans in his report at pages 21 and 24. You say: "Johnston Oils adopts the arguments set out and the conclusions reached by Mr Sylvester-Evans." I wonder if I could just clarify, if I may, Mr Elliott, what that means. Could you have Mr Sylvester-Evans' report, please. I hope, my Lord, copies have been distributed. What Mr Sylvester-Evans on these page has done, and he has set the consequences out in two tables, 3.1 and 3.2, are the two options: the first is LPG supplier responsible for tank up to the first stage regulator and table 3.2 is the LPG supplier responsible for tank and service pipework to the ECV. So the second is responsibility falling upon the supplier up to the pipe entering the building. Obviously, your current arrangement is the first of those. Which of Mr Sylvester-Evans' options do you support because, I think, in fairness, one of his recommendations is that this part of the Inquiry takes evidence on which option is preferable. Which one do you support? page 29 A. It would be 3.1, the one where we are responsible up to the first stage regulator. THE CHAIRMAN: Could we have that on the screen, please. MR MARTIN: 3.1 -- I am sorry, my Lord. 3.1 is LPG supplier responsible to first stage regulator. That is the one that is the status quo for J Gas and it is the one you support? A. Yes. Q. You obviously do not support then extending the responsibility of the LPG supplier to the service pipework to the point of entry to the building, to the emergency control valve? A. No. Q. Why do you not support that, given what you know about the hazards of the pipework between the tank installation and an ECV? A. The reason being I think was heard yesterday, that we don't have any control over the site itself. That's the main one. The other one that we haven't actually spoken about but I think there may be a question of insurance, from our insurers, as part of us insuring pipework on someone else's site. I don't know -- I think that could be a possible problem. Q. Of course presumably at the moment J Gas has insurance page 30 to cover the tank and the fittings up to the point of the first stage regulator? A. That's correct. Q. So can we agree, Mr Elliott, that this is only a matter of degree rather than principle that we are talking about? A. Could be, yes. Q. Have you made any enquiries of your insurer of what their attitude might be to this change? A. We have and we're waiting on them coming back to us on it. They've got to speak to ... Q. I think it might be helpful if the Inquiry were to be made aware of the response. Do you anticipate -- when do you think you might get it? A. I'll try and chase them up on it. Q. Because without dragging you back to give evidence, Mr Elliott, if you could provide in written form at least to the Inquiry the response it would be helpful to know that. A. Certainly. Q. Obviously one can understand, and Mr Betts gave some detail about this and I do not want to go over it, there is obviously a potential risk that because pipework is either underground or it might be fitted to a wall, whatever, is the responsibility of the supplier, it is page 31 nevertheless in the environment that the occupier has control over so that, as we heard, a fence post might be driven into the ground and rupture the pipe or something, a vehicle might damage it or whatever. A. Extension work or whatever. Q. What I have to put to you is that again is something which -- the tank is at risk at all times when J Gas are not there. A. Yes, I agree. Q. So again it is just a matter of degree, is it not? A. Well, I think with the vessel it's a steel -- it's a pretty standard vessel, it's a bit more robust than some -- vehicular damage or whatever to the vessel. For one you can see it. As far as pipework goes, it's back to what we said, out of sight out of mind. We don't know from day to day what's happening on the site. We can't control it. Q. You do not know that, even if the pipework belongs to the customer. A. No. Q. So, again, there is not actually a fundamental difference there, is there? A. Probably not. Q. To be fair to you I think what you would say is that if you have this assessment exercise that you described page 32 earlier when J Gas takes over an installation, then that is the proportionate response to the risks which exist because at least you know in its undamaged form at the when the tank is fitted J Gas has satisfied itself that the pipework is safe for the purpose? A. That's correct. Q. Of course events such as damage to pipework, excavation, whatever it might be, frankly it does not matter who owns the pipework. If that happens that is a problem that ought to be addressed by the person aware of it? A. Certainly and I think coming back to the report of Mr Sylvester-Evans the need for depending on, obviously after the risk assessment, the need for an annual inspection be it by an engineer, a surveyor or whatever, you could certainly pick up on if the site had changed, the conditions had changed. Q. So again it is a matter of proportionality is that fair? A. Yes. Q. You cannot literally oversee the pipe every hour of the day. A. No. Q. At the bottom of page 12 you say in answer to question 29 the last couple of lines: " ... Johnston Oils have no statutory right or responsibility to enforce duties upon a customer." page 33 I dare say that is a correct statement of the position, Mr Elliott, but Johnston Oils have the practical solution in their hands through the terms of the contract and ultimately refusing supply if you are dissatisfied with the condition of the equipment. A. Yes. Q. Of course somebody else might come in and do what you are not prepared to do but as far as Johnston Oils is concerned, is the absence of any statutory right to be able to control a client, a practical problem? A. It could be in that we could shoot ourselves in the foot as far as commercially. If we hold the moral high ground in every installation when we don't have anything to back us up as far as legislation goes. Q. Do I correctly understand what you are saying is that if, as a matter of its own procedures, J Gas adopts a more rigorous approach than its competitors and obviously there is a commercial consequence of that, it may be of disadvantage to J Gas? A. Yes. Q. If there was a statutory regime that applied to everybody -- A. Then it would be a level playing field. Q. Page 15, please. This is under the heading of "Education/dissemination". Perhaps I do not need to page 34 read the question because in the middle of the first paragraph after the question 36 you say: "As detailed above, Johnston Oils have and continue to issue the HSE leaflet on checking LPG pipework to their customers." You have covered that earlier. Then you say: "At present Johnston Oils is undertaking a site survey (which is distinct from the UKLPG survey referred to in paragraph 35) [so it is Johnston Oils own survey] of all installations both commercial and domestic and intends, upon completion of the survey, to share the results with all its customers." A copy sample of the survey is referred to. Do I understand correctly, Mr Elliott, that this survey is separate from the new procedure which has been adopted since 2005 at a tank exchange? A. Yes, it is. Q. What was then a specific assessment of the particular site which was being taken over? A. That's correct. Q. In parallel with that, as I understand this evidence, J Gas is systematically examining every installation to which it supplies gas? A. Yes. Q. How many of those are there, if you feel able to tell page 35 the Inquiry commercially? A. Thousands. Q. How far have you got? A. We've got halfway through it. Q. Presumably J Gas has employed, what, CORGI registered -- A. We have our own in-house engineers. Q. Who have the appropriate CORGI or whatever registration? A. Yes. Q. What do they do? Do they simply go to the site or do they make contact with customers and say, "Can we come and have a look"? A. Simply -- a surveyor, it's a surveyor that's doing it, to be honest, and he will go through X amount delivery sites every day and fill out the form as you see it and we will bring it back, go through them all and highlight the ones that have steel risers or issues regarding maybe a hut or a fence built next to the tank and relay it to the customers but the ones with steel pipework that is the ones we take forward, obviously, we write to the customer looking for permission to carry out remedial action. Q. So you write to the customer and explain that there is an issue with metallic pipework and what do you recommend? Supposing all the surveyor is able to see is a metallic riser going in and coming out, he does not page 36 know what is in between, what would be the advice to the client? A. This should be replaced. Q. Straight forward replace? A. Straightforward replacement of the risers. To be honest, we haven't found any that have steel pipework going from the tank to the building. It's only steel risers we have found. It may be because of the amount of time we've been in business. Q. I was just going to ask by the time you came into business, I think you said 23 years ago, we have heard from Calor that the practice was moving from all steel to steel risers and polyethylene horizontal supply or pipe. A. Yes. Q. How often have you had to recommend to a client, as a result of this survey, that they should replace their metallic risers? A. Hundreds -- hundreds. Q. What has the response to that been? A. The response has been very good, no problems. Q. Have they then engaged J Gas to do the replacement? A. They have, yes. Q. Presumably you have engineers who are doing that? A. Yes, we have in-house engineers. page 37 Q. And do you charge the client for that? A. We do. Q. Has there been any particular resistance or difficulty about it? A. There has been one or two, these are domestic I must highlight, domestic customers, and there has been one or two that have been awkward and then we send the salesman in and he maybe explains it a bit better face-to-face rather than in a letter and then we carry out the required remedial action. Q. I am assuming when people receive an explanation of why this is potentially critical then they can see the value of what you are proposing to do? A. They will do. We've only one customer who declined and he changed to oil. So ... Q. That solved the problem. A. Solved the problem. Q. I was going to ask that. Had anyone declined and you just explained that only one person out of approximately how many? A. About 300. Q. Are these all domestic customers or have they included equivalent installations? A. There's been some commercial customers as well. Q. So there is no difference between whether it is domestic page 38 or commercial in terms of what you are doing? You are just looking at the characteristic of the pipework? A. That's correct. THE CHAIRMAN: Could we see the survey on the screen, please, Mr Martin? MR MARTIN: My Lord, there are reference numbers given for this but I am just being told that they do not seem to relate to the document that we are looking for. I wonder if those instructing me could just try and find the document and we can come back to it. I was not necessarily asking further questions but it is important that your Lordship sees it. Try 14168, please. That is the first page. Is that what we are talking about? A. No, that's the pipeline risk assessment. Q. Let us just leave it. THE CHAIRMAN: We will have a look at that later on. MR MARTIN: It may be, I do not know if you are able to remain after your evidence for the rest of the day but it may be after you have finished you can assist and just look for the particular document and it can be put up for everybody to see. Thank you very much. 39: you are asked about the total number of non-domestic sites which may have metallic pipes and in page 39 the answer you say Johnston Oils does not hold specific information as to the total number of non-domestic sites which may have old metallic LPG service pipework. You do accept it would be desirable for such data to be available and you support the recommendations of Mr Sylvester-Evans. To what extent, so far as J Gas is concerned, is the information becoming available, first through the new installation assessment procedure you have described and through this survey exercise that you are carrying out? A. Yes. Q. We know the first is implemented. It simply depends how often people change tanks. When the survey is carried out -- you say you are about halfway through -- will the information from that provide, so far as the customers of J Gas are concerned, a complete record of -- a sufficient assessment of all the installations? A. It will once it's complete. Q. We will look at Mr Sylvester-Evans' recommendations in terms just briefly at the end. 45: I was going to ask you but I think you have probably answered the question, how effective has the guidance been. The answer is: "In general terms, in Johnston Oils' experience as a small organisation, they have not identified many page 40 situations where underground steel pipework has been located." Is that what you said earlier, that in fact in virtually all situations there may be metallic risers? Did you say you had not found any supply pipe which was steel? A. No. Q. Have they all been PE? A. They have all been PE, yes. There is instances where steel -- just to clarify -- where there is steel pipe but it's all back to the phase of what we said earlier. These are vapour installations we're talking about. Q. It is quite right to make that clarification. Is your survey covering both liquid phase and vapour phase installations? A. We have a different survey we do annually for liquid installations. Q. But a liquid installation would never be domestic? A. No. Q. And would only be an element or proportion of industrial, presumably where the customer has a particularly high requirement? A. It's mostly agricultural to be honest. Q. Grain driers I assume. A. Yes, that's exactly it. page 41 Q. Paragraph 50, just to confirm you adopt Mr Sylvester-Evans' recommendation of a verification scheme? A. We do. Q. At the top of page 20 you say: "It is impossible to give a specific frequency of inspection for all installations. The frequency will generally be determined by the outcome of a risk assessment by a competent person ..." We have Mr Sylvester-Evans' evidence on that. Do I take it that you would agree that if a survey reveals a modern up to standard undamaged PE system, then it may be appropriate not to inspect it again as frequently as a metallic system or a system with some -- A. Certainly, yes. As far as inspect it, I think we would still want to carry out an inspection of it. Not a visual inspection of the pipe but the actual site because I think the site conditions changing could have a detrimental effect on the pipe. So not as far as actually testing it, no. If it was a new system we probably wouldn't test it until the tenth anniversary of it actually going in. Q. In your experience, and I do not think anyone else has disagreed, if it a modern properly installed PE system that is appropriate? page 42 A. Yes. Q. Ten years? A. Yes. That's our written procedure. Q. Obviously if it is -- and I know you do not actually have any -- if it is revealed to be a metallic system, whether metallic risers or metallic throughout, and for whatever reason it is not being replaced at the time, do I take it you would support more frequent inspection regime? A. That would all depend on the risk assessment. That would highlight that. THE CHAIRMAN: Does it come to this then, Mr Elliott: what you are really working towards as a result of all these various decisions is to achieve a situation where all of your installations will be polyethylene piped from virtually from tank to emergency control valve? A. Where it is appropriate to do such. Again, it depends on the phase but, yes. THE CHAIRMAN: I understand. MR MARTIN: You say, "obviously it depends on the phase", and we have not been directly concerned liquid phase installations but is what his Lordship just said correct, if you confine it to vapour phase installations? A. Yes. page 43 Q. Aspiration is every installation PE, in effect, from tank installation to the ECV? A. That's correct. Q. In practical terms that is what is happening, presumably, over time? A. Yes. Q. Because if you have the tank installation, tank exchange procedure, customer is advised change to PE then -- A. It's done at the time. Q. -- most if not all are? A. Yes. Q. If your survey assessment reveals metallic pipework recommend change to PE, again by and large that is also happening? A. (Nodded) Q. When do you think if you can, Mr Elliott, the entire estate, if I can use that word, all of the installations of which J Gas is the supplier will have been converted to PE, again, I am talking of vapour phase? A. I would probably think we would hope to have it completed by July/August of next year. Q. Next year? A. Yes. Obviously the newer the installations we survey we're not coming up against steel risers. So it's really only from when we started in business that we are page 44 coming up against this. Q. We know from Calor Gas that, as far as they are concerned, the research which Mr Tomlin did, which you may have heard about, by and large polyethylene systems were fully being installed -- by about 1993 all of the systems being installed were PE and ever since. Is that the same for J Gas? A. Yes, it will be. You've just got to be careful when you have a rollover as we call it or an exchange the tank may be a 1993 tank but you could have still been connecting onto steel pipework. Q. I understand. Johnston Oils in question 58 do not, as I understand it, support -- you do support the extension of the GSIU regulations to non-domestic installations? A. Yes, we do. Q. May I ask you then to go to Mr Sylvester-Evans' recommendations, please, if I can have these on the screen, they begin at page 53 of his report and I acknowledge you have covered some of these in the narrative but it is helpful if we can have you go through them, please. Starting at the bottom of the page and then obviously on to the others. Recommendation 1: page 45 "Wherever possible the number of interfaces between responsible parties should be reduced to the minimum so they can be managed effectively." Do you support that? A. Yes, we do. Q. Number 2: "Each party has [I am reading very shortly] a clear account of the title and ownership and a diagram of the installation and a description of the responsibilities and accountability of each party." Do you support that? A. Yes, we would. Q. 3: "The UKLPG should prepare guidance on the general recommended practice for its members with respect to ownership, division of responsibilities and what duties that places on parties." Do you support that? A. Yes, we do. Q. Presumably the advantage of that is it would then uniform across the industry -- A. It would. Q. -- and clearly a difference that may exist between you and others and Calor about where the interface occurs that should be removed? page 46 A. (Nodded) Q. Thank you. 4: "The LPG user and the relevant landowner managing should be required to retain relevant up-to-date information on the system." I am not going to read the details. It should be held on-site in an LPG safety dossier. Do you support that? A. We support that. Q. May I take it that J Gas having regard to the information it may have received from its surveys or its exchange assessment would be prepared to provide that information to the customer so that it could be included in the safety dossier? A. We certainly would. Q. 5: "Every party who is responsible for buried metallic LPG pipework should develop an inspection and maintenance strategy, ongoing inspection" and so on. Do you support that, leaving aside the question of cathodic protection? A. Yes, we do. Q. Again, would the two strategies that you are following, the different inspection or assessment of installation page 47 and the survey exercise, would that play any part in achieving what is recommendation 5? A. I would think so, yes. Q. How? A. In line with what we're actually doing. I think we're pretty much carrying it out. Q. So you are, in effect, providing the client with the expertise to do what is necessary? A. Yes. Q. 6: "A certification or verification scheme be introduced that requires an independent competent person to verify the integrity of the system." I think you said you support that? A. We do. Q. What qualifications do you think the independent competent person would require to have? You may have heard the evidence about anomalies that may exist between different CORGI and ACS regimes. A. Our view is that any responsible supplier whose engineers or surveyors have experience within industry would be a competent person. I don't -- unless through UKLPG and HSE they develop some form of competency, we'd be happy to go along with that. But it's no substitute for experience. page 48 Q. But obviously you have CORGI qualified engineers for domestic installations. A. Yes. Q. You have already said the same people do the industrial installations. If the GSIUR are extended, then technically the same qualification is necessary. A. Yes. Q. Would you think there would be any practical difficulty in ICPs (independent competent persons) being available to provide this sort of periodic information? A. Not from my company. Q. 7: "Any verification scheme should be developed jointly by UKLPG with its members and the HSE." I think you agree to that? A. Yes. Q. 8: "All existing industrial and commercial LPG facilities are inspected and upgraded." I think you actually are doing that? A. We are. Q. 9: "UKLPG prepares practical advice for users." Obviously that is not directly related to the supply company but I take it you would agree with that? page 49 A. We would. Q. 10, this is perhaps not one directly for supply companies: "A process is put in place for each LPG user site." In effect, who is the responsible officer for the various elements. I take it that is something that could be in the safety dossier? A. Possibly, yes. Q. 11: "The LPG supplier should be obliged to provide the LPG user with a summary of its asset register." I think you have agreed to that, Mr Elliott? A. Yes. Q. "LPG users should be obliged to compile it." Well, you have already said you support that. 13: "Guidance for the practical template should be developed with UKLPG" and you support that. A. We do. Q. 14: "The Inquiry considers appropriate improving the ongoing communication from the supplier to the user of generic-type material." Do you see any benefit in that and any particular suggestions as to how it might be achieved? page 50 A. I think there's just a level of awareness needs to be focused on users and that best comes from suppliers, to be honest. Q. We have talked about various things. The dossier itself, as you said, creates a communication link between the supplier and the user. Presumably leaflets emphasising the customer's responsibility and explaining the supplier's responsibilities? A. Yes. Q. Presumably things like notices or painting of pipes, whatever, all of that could improve communication? A. Could help, yes. Q. Then the second arrow point is: "The formation of an LPG suppliers and users forum." What is your view about that? A. Yes, I think that would help. Q. How do you think the users, bearing in mind there is a vast range of different people all doing different things, whether it is domestic or industrial, and not necessarily having any interest in LPG other than it is a utility, how would you actually put together a representative group of users? A. I think maybe UKLPG would be better placed to answer that one, I think -- through other trade industries, et cetera. page 51 Q. 15: "HSE should publish more authoritative and detailed guidance." I take it you do not take any exception to that. 16: "Appropriate mechanisms are put in place to collate the existing and future data on LPG incidents with the LPG supplier." You said in your answers to questions certain things which I need to trouble you with about incidents and so on. Does J Gas provide information on incidents either to UKLPG or to the HSE or to whom ever? A. We do to UKLPG in the form of an annual report. Q. What does that actually do? Does it list every incident? A. It lists everything from problems with cylinders to bulk tank leaks, all sorts of stuff, road traffic accidents. It's a huge -- well, it's a big survey. Q. That is something provided to UKLPG presumably because they require it of members? A. Yes. Q. So they would be in a position to collate all of that for not quite the entire industry but certainly for the 95 per cent? page 52 A. 95 per cent, yes. Q. I think I am at 17: "An appropriate mechanism to be put in place to establish for industrial and commercial categories of bulk LPG sites and any other categories deemed useful to the Inquiry, key statistics to assist in assessing the overall risk and monitoring progress." Is that something which might come out of the information you have just been talking about? A. I think it probably would, yes. Q. Is J Gas providing to UKLPG any statistical analysis of the ongoing survey? A. No, we're not, no. Q. Would that play a part in providing information to be used more widely throughout LPG installations? A. I think there's already been a desktop exercise done in relation to steel pipe by UKLPG via its members. So they may have a good handle on the amount of, certainly domestically, how much steel risers there are in the country. Q. I can ask them about that. "During the transition phase implement a basic risk ranking method to prioritise LPG user sites." Of course as you would have heard from Mr Tomlin and also Mr Betts, that is something that Calor in page 53 effect are doing. You are doing a slightly different thing. You are actually carrying out a survey of every site? A. Yes. Q. If you are doing that and, as you say, it is likely to be completed by July or whenever next year, do you see any need for J Gas at the same time to implement a basic risk ranking method? A. No. Q. Why is that? A. Because we will hopefully have eradicated the problem by that time next year. Q. I understand that, Mr Elliott, but obviously in theory because you are just carrying this out on a basis of serving everything in time, there is obviously the risk there might be a installation deteriorating now that is critical and causes a problem before July? A. We would look -- it depends on the pressure, if it was a higher pressure installation maybe we would carry it out sooner, but if it's working 37 mbarg, it's low pressure. It will be fed into the programme. Q. 19: a registration scheme for LPG suppliers? A. Yes, we'd support that. Q. Presumably as a member of Association, in effect, that is already happening? page 54 A. Yes. I think to be honest most of the major suppliers in the UK are all part of the UKLPG. Q. 20: "Inquiry considers whether legislation is introduced whereby it would be a criminal offence to supply and use an LPG system which did not have an up-to-date verification certificate." Of course that is, in effect, to provide an ultimate sanction against either a nonmember of UKLPG or indeed someone who would simply be a site occupier connecting up a system or filling a tank which was unsafe? A. Yes. Q. Do you have any difficulty about that? A. No. Q. Lastly: "The Inquiry considers assigning target timescales for the implementation of its recommendations." Recognising it is specific to the work you are doing, as far as your site assessment exercise, that happens when there is a new supply or a tank exchange anyway now? A. Yes. Q. Secondly, the survey you are carrying out, you said to us, should be completed by -- A. Next summer. page 55 Q. -- the latter part, summer of next year. A. That's right. Q. Thank you very much. THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Elliott, in general terms of course if a recommendation of that sort were to be made, it would apply industry-wide and not necessarily related to your current survey. What would you say would be a realistic period of time that the industry could accept? A. Not knowing exact figures, I think domestically there are some high numbers of steel pipe or risers certainly out there. So it could take years to actually do. THE CHAIRMAN: That is the problem really because it is pretty obvious now that the priority is to find out where these metallic service pipe installations are and if that is going to take years, that in itself is a cause for concern. A. If all the companies carried out an actual visual survey I don't think that would take so long but certainly actual implementation of changing it all I think is all proportionate to the size of my business compared to Calor Gas and BP. MR MARTIN: I think that is a very fair point, Mr Elliott, and of course we know that Calor are carrying out this statistically-based assessment and at the end of the day page 56 will achieve, if it is fulfilled, it will have achieved the same result. A. It will. Q. All the metallic pipework will be changed to PE. Would it be reasonable for perhaps different strategies with the same ultimate purpose to be adopted by larger and smaller organisations, suppliers just in the way that you have described? A. It could, it could. It really depends on the circumstances as far as an engineering, you know, if they have their own in-house engineers, because I think we've already heard evidence about there could be a lack of engineering expertise. MR MARTIN: Of course it is fair to say that the Inquiry has heard from J Gas and heard from Calor but there are other particularly quite substantial members who have made some representations to this Inquiry but have not actually participated to give evidence. Thank you very much indeed, Mr Elliott. I have no further questions. I think others may have questions for you. THE CHAIRMAN: Mrs Stacey, you have some questions for Mr Elliott. MRS STACEY: As matters have turned out, my Lord, I do not any longer. page 57 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Gray, you have not actually applied to ask any questions but Mr Elliott is your witness so you are most welcome to address any questions you wish. MR GRAY: Thank you, my Lord. Examined by MR GRAY Q. I wonder if I might deal briefly with Mr Sylvester-Evans' report. Mr Elliott, you have been asked if J Gas has any difficulty with Mr Sylvester-Evans' recommendations and you have indicated, as I understand it, you have no difficulty with any of them. Is that correct? A. That's correct. Q. Would it also be fair to say that J Gas not only has no difficulty with those recommendations but in fact welcomes them? A. Yes, I think it would help the whole industry. Q. Do you find that the recommendations would be straightforward to apply? A. Again speaking only for my company, yes they would. Q. One of the principal issues which has been identified is the difficulty that users may have in understanding responsibilities that they have for the pipework and I think you would agree when you were asked questions earlier that that was a problem of which you were aware? A. Yes, it is. page 58 Q. Would a safety dossier be a means of bringing to the attention of users their responsibilities for pipework? A. Yes, it would. Q. Would a safety dossier also be a means of bringing to the attention of users their responsibilities not only for buried pipework but any changes in the environment in which pipework may be laid and the necessity of having regard to that factor? A. It would certainly highlight for them that even though they may have PE pipework that doesn't need to be tested for another ten years a change in the site could have a detrimental effect on the pipework. Q. You have also indicated that you welcome Mr Sylvester-Evans' recommendation that there be a verification scheme. A. Yes. Q. If there is a verification scheme does that have the benefit of ensuring not only that a user is aware of his responsibilities but is, in fact, doing what is necessary to ensure, insofar as is reasonably practicable, there is no danger presented by the use of LPG? A. I believe so. Q. Evidence was heard yesterday from Mr Betts that you may have heard that Calor did not think that it would be page 59 necessary to have a verification scheme and simply, provided the safety dossier is up-to-date, that would be sufficient. Do you have any comment on that? A. That's their choice. I think from our own point of view -- again, I go back to the fact that I know that checking the installation on the site is very, very important. Q. Would it be fair to say you could have a safety dossier which is up-to-date but that actually its contents would not be necessarily of the desired quality? A. You could. Q. If a verification scheme is in place and independent competent persons are there to enforce it, would that ensure that not only is the user aware of his responsibilities but was carrying out his duties properly? A. Yes, it would. Q. Insofar as independent competent persons are concerned, you have suggested that the engineers that you employ with qualifications as being CORGI registered and having other qualifications together with their practical experience would render them as being suitable people, in your opinion, to be independent competent persons? A. I believe so. page 60 Q. In one of the answers that were lodged on your behalf to questions asked by the Inquiry team you have indicated or J Gas indicated that, in their view, where there are new installations that the pipework should be installed by engineers employed by the suppliers? A. Yes. Q. Is it the position that for larger companies, such as Calor, that they will subcontract such work? A. We believe so. Q. Can you give an indication to the Inquiry of the difference, in your view, in ability or experience between engineers employed by you directly and those who may be simply subcontracted? A. I wouldn't really want to comment on someone else's engineers or their competency but our own engineers, in the fact that they are working with LPG on a daily basis and have the relevant qualifications and experience, I think is why we do not subcontract but we bring it in-house. Q. If a verification scheme were introduced, would J Gas think that there were any particular difficulties, in practical terms, of such a scheme being implemented? A. Not for J Gas. Q. Because is it the position that your engineers attend sites in any event on a reasonably regular basis, page 61 whether it be to fill tanks, exchange tanks and so on? A. Yes. Q. The last matter relates to the recommendation of Mr Sylvester-Evans that it be a criminal offence to either use or supply LPG without there being an up-to-date verification -- a safety dossier which has been verified and I understand that J Gas would welcome that recommendation. A. We would. Q. The expression has been used at some stage in this Inquiry that it would be desirable for any recommendations to have teeth and you may or may not have heard that. Is that a concern which J Gas has? A. It could be, in effect, we went along to commercial premises and suggested remedial work and they don't carry it out, then the ultimate would be that they would have to because no-one else would supply it because it would be a criminal offence. Q. It was suggested to Mr Betts at one stage in his evidence yesterday that it may be that the terms of the contract could be sufficient to encourage the user to adopt a certain approach. Would it be right to say if it were merely reliance was placed upon the terms of the contract that there page 62 would be nothing to prevent a user simply saying, "Well, I will go to another supplier who may have different contractual terms"? A. Yes. Q. And the introduction of criminal offence for using or supplying LPG without an up-to-date and verified safety dossier would that at least to a large extent remove that difficulty? A. I think it would. MR GRAY: Thank you very much, my Lord. THE CHAIRMAN: Mrs Ferguson, would you have any questions? Mr Macauley? MR MACAULEY: No, my Lord. THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Martin? Re-examined by MR MARTIN ^ re? Q. My Lord, just one matter if I might pick up with Mr Elliott because in the meantime we have been trying to identify the survey document and I would just like you to look at something. Could I have 14168 and the following page up again please. This was the page I put to you, Mr Elliott, and asked if this was the document to be used in the survey you were talking about and I think you said no. A. No, it's not. page 63 Q. Just looking at this document, is this the document which is used for the risk assessment at the time of the exchange? A. Yes. Q. We can see it for ourselves but it talks about risk categories and reading very short, the person making the assessment has to assess the risk category as low, medium or high and all factors we have talked about, whether it is metallic pipework or PE pipework, assessing the consequence of some sort of failure, whether it is above ground or below ground, passing through buildings, traffic. I will not go through the details but this can be seen to be what is done by the person who is assessing the location at the time that J Gas has been asked to provide a new supply. A. Yes. Q. What I understood from you was that the document or at least the output of the survey exercise was a bit more straightforward than that. A. Very much so. Q. And simply depended on whether or not the metallic risers were seen? A. Again, metallic risers and location of the vessel and also taking details of regulators, what you see on the page 64 top of the tank. Q. So there is a different document in your survey? A. Yes. Q. I think it is fair to say those instructing me have been speaking to your solicitor that for whatever reason it has not actually got to the Inquiry. A. I can certainly get you a copy. Q. So if you are looking into the other matter of numbers, if you would not mind providing that if you can. A. Of course. MR MARTIN: Thank you very much indeed, Mr Elliott. THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much for your evidence, Mr Elliott. I think we will stop for five or ten minutes to give the LiveNote writers a break. (12.03 pm) (A short break) (12.20 pm) MR MARTIN: The next witness is Mr Rob Shuttleworth of UKLPG. ROB SHUTTLEWORTH (called) Examined by MR MARTIN Q. Good morning, Mr Shuttleworth. I wonder if you could have before you the following documents for the purposes of my questions. The first is a document which is page 65 headed "Supplementary statement of Mr Rob Shuttleworth and Mr Jeff Watson, UKLPG". A. Yes. Q. This is a statement that was prepared by you and by Mr Watson -- he is a technical manager of UKLPG -- in anticipation of the fact that you would both be available to give evidence to this Inquiry. I do not think Mr Watson is here today. Is that right? A. He is still available when you reconvene. Q. What I was just going to say it is my hope that we will not need to call him, but you can bear in mind that and also, to be fair, if there is anything I ask you about which properly ought to be addressed by him, then we will talk about that. But it is certainly my anticipation that your evidence will be sufficient for our purposes. The second document is the answers to the questions which were addressed by the Inquiry and UKLPG provided in tabulated form. I hope you have that document. A. I do. Q. Then circulated this morning is a copy of the request for information which led to the answers to these questions, the request for information from UKLPG and an earlier version was circulated a couple of days ago but page 66 it, in fact, was out of kilter with the numbers. So you should have the one that was original. Then finally Mr Sylvester-Evans' report which I hope you have had an opportunity to look at and I shall be asking you at the end of my questions to go through his recommendations just to confirm ultimately what the position is. A. Certainly. Q. Just beginning from the supplementary statement, what I intend to do is to take your qualifications and experience, then go to the answers to the questions, then come back to one or two additional matters in the supplementary statement and then go to Mr Sylvester-Evans' report. You are currently the Company Secretary and Chief Executive of UKLPG. You took over that post about two years ago after you had been at an oil company which supplies LPG wholesale. You have been involved as the LPG business manager and the wholesale sales together with some to agricultural premises rather than domestic or small commercial premises? A. Yes. Q. Previously you worked in the retail division of the company in question. Your role is to run the Association and to ensure proper governance. page 67 We are aware that the UKLPG came into existence I think just at the beginning of this year; is that right? A. That's correct, yes. Q. As an amalgamation of ALGEN and the LPGA? A. ALJET strictly. Q. I beg your pardon. It is easy to get one's acronyms wrong; we have rather many of them. As far as the evidence we have heard thus far, your membership comprises about 95 per cent of those who are suppliers of LPG in the United Kingdom? A. Yes. I checked some numbers and I would say that to the best of my knowledge there are 400 who are not members who supply bulk gas in some form. In terms of their size and sales, they represent about 1 per cent of the total UK sales of LPG. So it's a very small proportion of the business that is not membership, but we have contact with those companies. THE CHAIRMAN: What sort of people are these, Mr Shuttleworth? A. They are independent people. They may have worked for some of the larger gas companies before and set up on their own as an independent body. Some of them will operate from plants, they will distribute bottled gas or other gas. They abide by Codes of Practice but they choose, for whatever reason, not to be a member of the page 68 trade association. THE CHAIRMAN: Forgive me for asking this, but presumably then your organisation includes all the majors of the industry? A. It does. THE CHAIRMAN: Who are they? A. The four major players Calor Gas, Flo Gas, Shell and BP in terms of end use delivery of gas. I mean, there are obviously the oil companies that supply LP gas bulk into the marketplace but they are not dealing with direct, end use, small customers. THE CHAIRMAN: Really you are in the retail side of the industry? A. We have some wholesale membership, for example, Total, Konoco Phillips, Texaco Chevron are members too. THE CHAIRMAN: I think one of the things we need to consider though is whatever recommendations are made of course will be made industry-wide. That is obvious. How does one get the 5 per cent into the tent, so to speak? We will think about that and deal with that at a later stage in your evidence. MR MARTIN: Thank you, my Lord. You have very helpfully provided me with an answer to what I was going to ask you about, Mr Shuttleworth. The 95 per cent, whether it is absolutely accurate or page 69 not, in a sense is the number of participants who are not members of the UKLPG? A. Yes. Q. But what you have also said -- and I was going to ask you this -- is what, as it were, quantity of supply do they represent and you say about 1 per cent because they are smaller organisations? A. It's our estimate based on what some of the member companies know about them. Q. So, in other words -- and please correct me if I present this wrongly -- but if one way or the other desirable practice was going to be achieved through Codes of Practice regulated by the UKLPG, then assuming all your members complied with them, one would get about 99 per cent coverage of the actual supplies that are made to retail customers in the situations we are talking about? A. Yes, that's correct. Q. That would cover both industrial, other commercial and domestic? A. Yes. I mean, the total sales include Auto Gas, agriculture, et cetera, yes. So agricultural sales we talked about earlier today, I think liquid supply into agriculture and also sales to the Auto Gas market for cars that run on gas. page 70 Q. Include or exclude? A. They are included in the total number. Q. Perhaps I might suggest, as it is slightly difficult to hear your evidence, if you could pull the microphone closer. Thank you. If you could then go to the answers to the questions, please, in the table and if we have the questions document to hand, then we can relate it to what you say to any particular question. At the moment I am really just looking for some confirmation of information. In answer to question 1 which is just a general question about the aims and objectives of the UKLPG, you set these out and you say your mission is to champion and guard safety and technical standards, provide advice and guidance and promote the safe use of LPG. Are these in your Articles of Association or rules of membership for members of UKLPG or how are they actually incorporated into what you do? A. We have memorandum in the association which exists not exclusively but covers a broad range of activities and focus and then we have some specific articles which cover membership and the governance of the board, AGMs, et cetera. Q. Obviously members by becoming members and being accepted page 71 as members will in effect sign up to this. Thank you. In answer to question 8 you described the Board. I do not know if you heard the discussion I had with Mr Elliott about this. Although there is one individual board member it is not apparent that there is any customer interest in the board. That may be for perfectly obvious reasons, Mr Shuttleworth, but I just wonder have you given any thought to users being represented and, if so, how? A. The answer is the individual is a member of the industry but they can be voted on by all members rather than category of membership. So it's the opportunity for someone who takes a broader view of the industry to sit on the Board and take a different view from people looking at national gas supply or national gas supply position but, no, we don't have customers on. We are an industry trade association and, to be frank, it hasn't really been considered. It hasn't been considered. Q. In a sense, I understand that because it would be difficult to find a small number of representative individuals from a vast range of different customers. As you will see from Mr Sylvester-Evans' recommendations, one of them is that there is a supplier and users' forum set up. A. Yes. page 72 Q. One way in which something like that might be achieved would be for customers to have some sort of involvement in UKLPG. A. Indeed and I think when we come on to discussion of recommendations, that has the broad support of the board that a user forum is set up or maybe user forums because there are a variety of users of LPG and some are quite different from others. So it may be appropriate that you have one or two forums representing specific user types. But the industry is broadly supportive of that. I think the feeling about putting a customer on the board is there is certainly room and one area we are considering is looking at external board members from either other trade bodies or even regulatory authorities such as Health & Safety Executive or non-Government organisations. I think there is room to broaden membership there. Q. I am not in any sense implying criticism, but it is of interest to the Inquiry because it is not immediately obvious to me how you find a representative customer or customers to be on a forum or be on the board or whatever, but it is something you support in principle? A. It's something we support in principle, for a user forum. page 73 Q. Question 13, please, on the second page of the table. This question was asked, how many of the LPG suppliers also provide bulk LPG to domestic customers? That is to say, how many industrial commercial suppliers? You said: "UKLPG is aware of three of its members who only supply to other LPG companies." That in a sense is the wholesale element? A. That's correct. Q. Which you mentioned his Lordship: "That said, UKLPG does not currently seek to identify suppliers to specific market sectors. (Note: this situation will change in response to a Competition Commission Inquiry into the domestic bulk LPG market)." Could you please just provide a little bit more explanation to the qualification there. What is it about the Competition Commission Inquiry which will lead to the UKLPG identifying suppliers to specific market sectors? A. The Competition Commission in their findings have required the trade association to provide information about domestic gas suppliers to customers by region of the country or potentially county; so they can basically come to our website, phone us or write to us and find out who can supply gas in that area, their telephone page 74 number, their address and their website details. Q. Is this, as you understand it, by and large for the purpose of their ensuring that there is a sufficient range of suppliers in any area so that there is sufficient competition? A. Yes. I think it's so a customer can find an easy means of access to find who can supply them with gas in their area. Q. Obviously, a by-product of that, if the UKLPG is involved, is that you will then have information about who supplies and to which categories in particular areas? A. Yes. Q. Question 15 is in reference to Code of Practice 22 and the fact that it has evolved since its initial publication in 1990. The current edition is 2002. You say that a revised version is in preparation. Is that something which is technically available to the Inquiry and would you want to place any particular weight on it? A. I believe that Mr Watson already supplied a copy of the new version of the Code of Practice 22 and a précis of the significant changes to that. Q. That is a very fair answer, Mr Shuttleworth. I asked the question as I did because I was not sure if there was any commercial confidentiality attaching to these page 75 documents? A. No. The Codes of Practice are public documents. They are up on our website. That Code of Practice still has to go through a formal consultation procedure but we have started the process now so it is available for people to review and make comments on. Q. When would you anticipate that all the requirements for consultation and so on, an ultimate decision, when would you anticipate a revised version coming into effect? A. We anticipate it to be early summer 2009. Q. So within about 9 months or so? A. Yes. Q. Just a very small point, Mr Shuttleworth: question 16 is about when the original CoP 22 became available because I think there is no doubt that it was dated 1990, February 1990. There is some suggestion it may have been in existence before that, but you cannot assist with that discrepancy? A. I'm afraid we can't. We looked into it and asked other people who may have been around but we can't help, I'm afraid. Q. Question 19 is to what extent might the standards in the Code of Practice be said to reflect the lowest common denominator as put forward, set by members. Your answer page 76 to that question is: "UKLPG believes that the codes represent good practice but we accept that they may not be absolutely best practice. If the codes were the lowest common denominator, they are not likely to be acceptable to the technical and safety management team or the UKLPG board." I can understand precisely what you are saying. I assume that part of that is because any Code of Practice ultimately has to be the subject of a consensus on behalf of the range of members with their individual commercial interests? A. It does have to be consensus. It is not just members but the Health & Safety Executive or other bodies who may represent users or people employed with that particular Code of Practice. But ultimately the Technical Safety and Management Team primarily are delegated to review it and make a recommendation on publication to the Board and it can't be published until the Board have approved(?) it. Q. We have heard from Mr Elliott this morning of J Gas, who is one of your members -- I do not know if you were present -- A. I was present. Q. -- to hear his evidence. That is helpful. page 77 Obviously what he said is that so far as the inspection of an installation at the time of a tank exchange is concerned, the Code of Practice since the occurrence at Grovepark Mills in 2004 has not changed, but J Gas have adopted a procedure which, in effect, requires a risk assessment before they agree to supply and the customer accepting the outcome of that risk assessment. This is not intended to be a criticism, of course, but is that in a sense an example of where the code is not necessarily best practice because an individual supplier can aspire to and indeed deliver something which is of a higher standard? A. Well, clearly an individual supplier can take actions over and above in other circumstances other than that and individual suppliers can do that by assessing the situation for their company and their customers. We will deal later on when we talk about the risk matrix over pipework replacement and quite a lot of the effort of the industry is trying to go to get a consensual approach on the risk matrix so it is an industry-wide approach. Mr Elliott and J Gas are moving ahead on a customer by customer basis to do that. It certainly -- it's different practice. You can argue it's best practice but evidence about numbers of page 78 customers out there and I think industry figures unless we address those at high risk first we will not use the limited resource to do that correctly. So I think different companies of different sizes will take a view. Having said that I don't believe J Gas will be the only company doing that. I think other companies may well be taking the same action. Q. I think it is recognised that it is perhaps more straightforward for an enterprise the size of J Gas to do what it is doing. Mr Elliott, I think, was quite clear about that but as Calor or one of the other larger suppliers it is more difficult. We know of course what Calor is doing as part of its arrangements is the creation of the risk-based matrix that I am not sure, if you heard Mr Tomlin's evidence or are familiar with it anyway but as you rightly say achieves a prioritisation of those most at risk. Again neither of the Calor approach nor the J Gas approach is actually set, I think, in the Code of Practice but they are, as it were -- and this is not a criticism -- better practices, if you like, higher achieving steps than the code would actually require? A. That's correct and I mean, I think the codes are the published and reviewed every three years. They have been in existence, many of them, for some time. What we page 79 are dealing with here is recognition that there is an issue and how do we address that issue in a timely manner and rather than do it through a Code of Practice the industry will talk further about the risk matrix because there's an industry-wide approach on that linked to the Calor approach and rather than wait for a Code of Practice or rewrite a Code of Practice we are preferring to focus on the necessary activity to identify those most at risk and address a replacement programme. Q. Answer 22 -- and really these are just general questions about the status of the Code of Practice -- Mr Betts of Calor described the Code of Practice having the effect in certain respects of being prescriptive, for example, siting of tanks was the example he gave which, in effect, meant it was mandatory on a member of UKLPG although it was only an industry Code of Practice. Do you agree that that is actually the effect of the UKLPG Code of Practice? A. Within the Code of Practice we use words such as "shall" or "should" and when they say "shall" that is prescriptive. Q. It does not have the force of law of course, but presumably if a member were to a sufficient degree not to fulfil the standard that was expected, then one way or another, the UKLPG would be able to take steps page 80 against the member? A. Yes. I mean, the Code of Practice -- our view is if you adhere to the Codes of Practice you will be operating within the law. You may choose to look at a situation and do a separate risk assessment. You may have older installations and adhere to older Codes of Practice. You may risk assess and you may decide that whatever you choose to do is maybe better than the Code of Practice, but you have arrived at it by a different route and I wouldn't see that as a breach of the Code of Practice. But as a minimum we see it as an adherence of the law. They are not, as you say, law but adhering to them will ensure you operate within the law. Q. But from the point of view if they do something more, that is not a problem because that is what we have just talked about. Both J Gas and Calor appear to be doing it. But if they fail to fulfil their requirements in a way that was inadequate, what would ultimately happen? Can the member be disciplined? Obviously in an extreme case, can they be expelled? A. The membership can be suspended or it can be terminated for serious breaches of the Code of Practice and the board, there are paragraphs in the Articles of Association, which I am happy to make available to Inquiry team the relevant paragraphs so you can see in page 81 what circumstances members can be suspended or membership terminated and the powers the board have over that. Q. What you have explained as a mechanism is not surprising because that is the sort of nature of these organisations. I suspect it might be helpful ultimately for the material collated by this Inquiry if the actual provisions were made available but I do not need to ask any questions about them. THE CHAIRMAN: If you have it readily to hand, you could perhaps send it in, Mr Shuttleworth. A. We can do that. MR MARTIN: Of course, the suppliers who are members of the UKLPG are clearly within the jurisdiction that we have just been discussing. Would you agree that one of the issues faced by the events which are the subject of this Inquiry is, of course, that customers are not subject to an equivalent regime in terms of their responsibilities towards pipework? A. Well, I think it's our view that the legal regime that applies to customers at the moment under the Health and Safety at Work Act and other regulations should have been adequate and did provide the regulatory setting for the customers to be responsible for activities in their workplace. I think we set that out in our submission page 82 made prior to these supplementary submissions being made. Q. I think there is probably no doubt, Mr Shuttleworth, that, as a matter of strict law, customers should be aware of the responsibilities and should fulfil them and if they are fulfilled then events, such as occurred at Grovepark Mills, should not happen. But we also know that customers are perhaps not as aware as they ought to be and Mr Sylvester-Evans has described this "as out of sight and out of mind". Could you look, please, at his report at paragraph 2.3.5. That is on page number 16 of the document. In this paragraph, there is a relatively lengthy quotation from an HSL report (that is Health and Safety Laboratory report) into industry practice regarding the integrity of buried metal LPG pipework. I hope you have had an opportunity to consider this quote. It is at some length and I am certainly not going to read it out but, by and large, what it demonstrated was that to a considerable extent over the estate of LPG pipework installations those who were responsible for them had low levels of understanding and knowledge, they had not considered risk assessment particularly relating to buried metal pipework, they did not have documentation and records, maintenance programmes were rare, and many page 83 thought that the maintenance of the buried metal pipework was the responsibility of the tank provider and/or the LPG supplier. I take it you were aware of that research. It would suggest -- A. No, I was not aware of that research. This was the first time I'd seen that document, that research. Q. I understand that but, by and large, having regard to the events which were the subject of evidence of Phase 1 of this Inquiry, which I would suggest is a clear example of exactly the situation that we find in that passage in the HSL report, does the UKLPG accept that there is an issue about responsibility for pipework downstream from tanks which needs to be addressed? A. I think that report clearly states there is an issue and I was disturbed to read that, as were other members of the industry. As I said, we'll talk further about the risk replacement programme but it adds a sense of urgency to ensuring information and the replacement programme is addressed. Q. We will come back to that. Question 23 on the table, reading very short, the UKLPG sees no advantage in approved Code of Practice status. You heard my questions of Mr Elliott. I do not want page 84 to labour this. I take it is because given the nature of UKLPG and the requirement of members to fulfil UKLPG Codes of Practice the practical effect would be no different? A. That's absolutely -- approved Code of Practice relates to specific law. If as has been discussed GSIUR were to be extended then potentially an improved Codes of Practice could apply from GSIUR but our feeling is our Code of Practice more than cover all aspects needed for gas suppliers addressing pipework, et cetera. Q. Question 26, you say that the distinction between the technical Codes of Practice that you have been discussing earlier and user information sheets for customers, I take it UKLPG has no difficulty in principle about being responsible for UK information sheets which can be distributed or provided to customers? A. No, we are comfortable with that. Q. Question 37 which asks what if in information does UKLPG have as to the total number of LPG non-domestic sites which may have old metallic LPG service pipework of an unknown or suspect standard? The answer is that you do not have such statistical data. You are aware that members have about 70,000 bulk LPG non-domestic sites but these will cover a vast range page 85 of applications. Many of these will not have metallic pipework and few of the remainder will present the unusual risks presented by ICL, gas entry below ground, basements, et cetera. Leaving aside that latter part and hearing what Mr Elliott has said about the information that his organisation, J Gas, is obtaining, is there any other experience you are aware of within the industry of other suppliers collating or obtaining equivalent information to J Gas? A. We ask all our members to undertake a desktop study to make a broad estimate on domestic locations of how many installations had metal risers, which was the most obvious thing seen and known about and we estimate about 30 per cent of domestic installation had metal risers. It doesn't mean, as we heard in evidence from Calor Gas and from J Gas, that there would be metallic pipework throughout. We would assume a broad or similar percentage might be apply to commercial. Q. We are aware that Mr Elliott's company is providing some of this information to UKLPG. Is UKLPG, assuming others were to do the same industry-wide, prepared to accept the responsibility for, as it were, collating statistical data to try and get a more detailed picture throughout the country? page 86 A. Yes. I mean, that's what we are working on. We have asked all members to take the desktop exercise forward to a visual inspection and report back by January next year. Q. So when do you expect the exercise to be completed in the sense of there being available for general consultation statistical data in the sense described in the question? A. I would hope early next year, once we have had the returns. Q. I assume there is no resistance to providing this from any of your members? A. No. Q. In the second part of the answer to question 37, you say UKLPG is working with HSE to establish the number of location sites which may be at risk and to pass appropriate guidance to them. I am bound to say at the moment, Mr Shuttleworth, and it will no doubt be covered by witnesses from the Health & Safety Executive, it is a little difficult to identify within their material what exactly this exercise is. It would help me, if you would not mind, if I just asked you a series of questions to try and find out. First, there is the survey work or the risk page 87 assessment work being done by Calor that Mr Tomlin described. That is not what this sentence is talking about, is it? A. That's part of the same exercise, yes. It's part of the same exercise. Q. Just leave that for a moment. I will come back to it because you are going to help us with what the risk matrix assessment is. There is work being done by the Health and Safety Laboratory, as I understand it, about gas propagation through different types of soils. That is a separate exercise. It may be related but that is not what we are talking about here, is it? A. Again, that's part of the same exercise. That was to verify the Calor model to enable us to establish which locations might be more at risk than others. Q. So in a sense they are all part of a single exercise contrary to maybe what I was thinking? A. It is all part of a single exercise, yes. Q. If we take Mr Tomlin's work and if we take the HSL work, what else is being done, particularly between HSE and UKLPG, ultimately to produce a result? A. Okay, I did detail the steps we've undertaken at the end of our supplementary statement. Q. I am going to come back to that then. page 88 A. But in terms of answering the question, we are hoping to, as I say, establish the numbers of outlets with metallic risers by early part of next year. At the same time, we want to put together a risk matrix based on the information we gather from the HSL research programme and other factors we know that may be at risk, which obviously includes the type of pipework, the pressure. We have talked about soil type and there may be specific issues around the actual pipework fitting at a particular location which would make it higher risk than others if it were, for example, to enter below ground level that would be deemed a higher risk than one where it goes in above ground level and that would then prioritise those LPG locations that need to have the pipe replaced. Q. Thank you for that. I will come back to the risk matrix. I just wanted to understand where it fitted in to what other people appeared to be doing but I think it is clear that if everything we have heard about is ultimately part of the same exercise with the same purpose? A. That's right. Q. Could you go to question 54, please. I think this is a reference to question 53. You say: "UKLPG is of the view that the current prescriptive page 89 framework already quite clear. The site operator is responsible for compliance", that is to say for compliance in respect of downstream pipework, if I can use that general expression. That of course is not prescribed by law, is it? A. I wouldn't be able to answer that question. Q. I am sorry, it probably was not a good way of putting the question. Where the division of responsibility occurs (that is to say, responsibility for the tank and fittings and responsibility for the downstream service pipework), where the responsibility changes, that is not identified by law, is it? It depends on the individual contract between supplier and customer? A. That's correct. Q. I will say a little bit more about this in relation to question 55 but it is presumably perhaps a function of history but also a function of how LPG suppliers choose to operate which leads to the customer being given responsibility by and large for pipework downstream of the tank and up to the point of the emergency control valve? A. Yes. Q. Has UKLPG, as the body, as it were, representing all of the participants or virtually all the participants in the LPG supply market, has it had any discussions about page 90 whether or not the current arrangements for where the responsibility changes are appropriate? A. No, not in that detail, no. I mean, in the sense of, is it -- are you saying that because different companies have different practices have we had a discussion about standardisation? Q. Not at the moment the fact that different companies have different practice, just the principle of the thing. A. The principle of the thing, yes, we have and the industry agrees that it is appropriate generally around the first stage regulator but we understand different companies have different practices, as we heard in evidence here. Q. I am going to come just in a moment to the differences in practice, but as you will be aware, Mr Sylvester-Evans has put forward for the consideration of this Inquiry two options. One is basically that situation; in other words, the status quo. A supplier responsible for tank and fittings up to a point, probably the first stage regulator; customer responsible for the pipework, the service pipework downstream to the ECV. That is option 1. Option 2 is that the supplier takes responsibility for all of that pipework. Now we have heard from Calor, we have heard from J Gas. Neither of them supports option 2, but has UKLPG page 91 or its predecessor organisations, amongst the participants themselves, debated the merits of these options? A. No, we haven't debated the merits of Mr Sylvester-Evans' report options as a board. That is something I could ask the Board for an opinion of and submit to the Inquiry. Q. You see it was not so much debating his specific recommendations but debating this whole concept of dividing loyalty because, without trying to be contentious at the moment, Mr Shuttleworth, on the one hand if you give the customer responsibility for the downstream pipework, then the risk is, for the reasons we have already discussed, the customer is not properly aware of it and does not do anything about it and that is potentially hazardous, and the LPG supplier, who understands the business, on the face of it, would be much more likely to pay attention to what would need to be done. On the other hand, as has been said by both of the relevant witnesses, if you give the LPG supplier responsibility for downstream pipework, he does not have the day-to-day ability to control the site and to know things that might happen to put it at risk. One can see the competing arguments and all I am page 92 really asking is whether your members, either in the UKLPG or its predecessor organisations, have actually debated these things? A. As a collective group in the time I have been there not specifically but in terms of understanding company views they would support the Calor and J Gas view. Q. To be fair, you say that in your response to Mr Sylvester-Evans. Do you accept, and if in a sense you do not feel you can speak for the organisation on this I would understand, but do you accept that because of the ability and expertise of the supply companies there would be a potential advantage in their having responsibility for all the service pipework? A. I think our feeling has been that it is better still the responsibility for any location rests with one person, who is the operator, and there may be merits in ensuring there are means that they can ensure they get competent people to address the pipework and better information about the risks, but that the responsibility rests with them. MR MARTIN: My Lord, I am happy to break at that point. I wonder if I could just indicate, Mr Neale, who of course is one of the Inquiry witnesses speaking to his report, is only available this afternoon. I do not necessarily page 93 anticipate that his evidence will take very long but I certainly would not want him or the Inquiry to be put under any pressure if there was a difficulty in completing Mr Shuttleworth and in completing all of the evidence of Mr Neale this afternoon. What I was going to suggest was if it was agreeable to your Lordship and to others -- and I apologise to Mr Shuttleworth for this happening -- is if I might call Mr Neale first thing after lunch, assuming he is available, and deal with his evidence in its entirety and then return to Mr Shuttleworth. I hope that that evidence will still all be concluded this afternoon but given, not least, we may have to ask Mr Watson to come anyway in due course it is not quite such an inconvenience. THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Shuttleworth, I think we are looking at the possibility here that we might not conclude your evidence today. I am very sorry about that. Would it cause you any particular difficulty to have to come back? A. No, I would be able to come back. THE CHAIRMAN: Wold that be all right? A. That's fine. THE CHAIRMAN: I am very grateful to you for that. It is important, I think, that we hear Mr Neale and if he is page 94 only available today then I think we should hear him immediately after lunch. MR MARTIN: That is very good of your Lordship, thank you. THE CHAIRMAN: I am most grateful to you, Mr Shuttleworth, that is very helpful. (1.05 pm) (Luncheon Adjournment) (2.11 pm) MR MARTIN: My Lord, as intimated this morning, the next witness Mr Brian Neale's evidence is to be interposed because Mr Neale is available only this afternoon. BRIAN NEALE (called) Examined by MR MARTIN Q. Mr Neale, you should have before you the relatively brief Inquiry statement which you provided and then a copy of your report, final report, dated 30th November 2005, which begins at the Inquiry page number 7540, although the version I am working from, and perhaps the version you are working from, I will probably deal with the individual page numbers which I have. A. Yes, I do. Q. So far as your qualifications and experience are concerned, you are now an independent consultant, formerly a Principal Specialist Inspector of Health and Safety with the Health & Safety Executive, a chartered page 95 engineer, a Fellow of the Institution of Civil Engineers and a Fellow of the Institution of Structural Engineers and now an Honorary Fellow of the Demolition Engineers after qualifying as a fellow. You have worked in the construction industry for over 40 years and you became chartered over 35 years ago. I am not going to go through with paragraphs 2 and 3 of your statement the summary of your considerable experience but we can see that for ourselves. In paragraph 4 you set out the history of your involvement in this event, having been telephoned by a Mr Wilson, a manager of a specialist group in the HSE to tell you about aspects of HSE's involvement in the explosion and collapse of the building at Grovepark Mills on 11th May 2004, and the report which you are speaking to at this Inquiry is the consequence of your investigations into that. Is that right? A. That's correct. Q. Indeed, we know from a previous witness, Mr Hawkesworth who spoke at the end of Phase 1 of the Inquiry, the HSE commissioned a number of specialist reports on different disciplines which were ultimately, as it were, taken into account and Mr Hawkesworth gave an overview of how they all provided an explanation for the events which page 96 occurred. If I could then just ask you, please, a number of matters arising out of your report, if you could help the Inquiry, I am certainly not going to ask you to read through it. Could you go to what I have as page number 16. The page numbers at the bottom of the middle of the page. Before that you set out summary and contents and so on. I hope I do not need to trouble you with those. Under the heading of "Current regulation standards and codes" in relation to Scotland you talk about the new Building Scotland Act. Then you refer in the second paragraph of 2.4.1 to a regulation, regulation 4 (a), which was introduced into the Workplace Health Safety and Welfare Regulations 1992, which amendment came into force in September 2002 and you quote that regulation as: "Stability and solidity 4(a) where a workplace is a building, the building shall have a stability and solidity appropriate to the nature of the use of the workplace." Of course these are the regulations, perhaps the principal regulations, promulgated under the Health and Safety at Work Act itself. The question I want to ask you, Mr Neale, and I am page 97 certainly not wishing to seek you to give a definitive legal opinion, as it were, but would you regard the existence of that particular regulation, its place in the Workplace Regulations and its situation under the hierarchy of which the Act is at the top as creating a Health and Safety at Work obligation rather than what might be called a building control obligation? A. Yes. My understanding is that it came into to be through occupational health and safety, an EU or EC directive under occupational health and safety and, therefore, it seemed to come, yes, fairly and squarely under Health and Safety at Work. Q. We are going to have evidence from officials from the Health & Safety Executive later, but certainly given your experience that -- A. I'm not a legal expert, as you know, but that's ... yes, I agree with that. Q. I would like then to turn to the principal purpose of your evidence which is to have examined and to seek to explain the sequence of events which led to the collapse of the building. That begins by a description of the original structure at page 18. Having done that, you give various descriptions of alterations and modifications that have happened over the years, you then give certain page 98 information about matters which have been identified and then ultimately your conclusions on what actually happened. The basic question I would like to ask you first, Mr Neale, is we know as a result of the tragic events the building almost entirely collapsed and was destroyed as a building and clearly a very large quantity, as I recall, 5,500 tonnes of material, we have seen photographs. From your point of view and in a sense carrying out a forensic exercise of trying to work out what happened, how satisfied were you that having carried out all of the research you have described and all the various pieces of evidence that have been recovered, how satisfied are you that you have come to a satisfactory explanation of what took place? A. Can I just first say that I saw the material not on site but where it had been taken to after the event. From the evidence I saw I am satisfied that, to the best of my ability and the evidence that was there, I have recorded what I saw and the opinions. It is difficult because it was some time after the event, as I think you probably know, there were skip loads of material and materials were not in place. So, yes, I looked at various indicators and marks and come page 99 to conclusions that seem appropriate from the evidence there. Q. Beginning at page 20, beginning at the page before but with a diagram on page 20, you set out the characteristics of the building. Although there are various additions and alterations that you discuss elsewhere, in essence, we are talking about the four-storey mill building structure which was, as it were, a rectangular building by way of footprint situated in Grovepark Mills, the model of which is to your left. Having regard what you said here, Mr Neale -- and we can see the diagram which is on page 20 -- I wonder if you could just stand up maybe a little bit closer to the model and identify for all concerned the various features that we are talking about. I will try to guide you through these but please do not hesitate to interrupt me if I am not correct. So if you just get up and look at the model, please. A. Could I add one thing that my knowledge of the building is also added to by the statement by Mr Thompson who examined the structure I believe on the day or soon after. So there is an addition of various issues. Q. We have lifted the relative floor plates up one or two storeys to make it easier to demonstrate. Obviously in page 100 its exact position the four floors or at least the three floors plus the roof surface at the top would be down I think is it one level in actuality but I do not think it is difficult? THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Martin, I think we should all come a bit closer to the model. MR MARTIN: I am happy for people to do that. THE CHAIRMAN: The families cannot see because of the tank. MR MARTIN: We are familiar from earlier evidence obviously, Mr Neale, about the general characteristics of the building, it is rectangular, the window bays, the four floors, ground floor plus three. We know, for example, that it was originally a pitched, I think a slate roof which had been altered. A. Double pitched, yes. Q. What I am really asking you just to demonstrate are various features that you refer to in your report about, as it were, the way the building was held together internally. The first thing I would like to ask you about are the columns. We know there is a central line of columns and we can see that from the diagram on page 21. These are the vertical cast iron columns that you describe and they ran longitudinally along the centre line of the inside of the building on each of the floors? page 101 A. Yes. Q. They were cast iron columns dating, insofar as you were able to identify, from the original construction of this building just after the middle of the 19th century? A. I was told -- I was taken to the shed where they were and told, so took the evidence from other people that that is where those cast iron columns came from, yes. Q. If we then take the top of the column at ground floor ceiling level (that is to say, first-floor floor level) and it is obviously separated in the model for purposes of demonstration, but putting it generally, the floor structure rested on the columns; is that right? A. That is true, yes. Do you want me to describe it or ... Q. I was going to say there was then a device on the top of the column at that point, what did it have above it to create the location of ultimately the floor? A. I will use my hands, if you don't mind, to help. So that is the top of the column there. There was these beams, which is a double timber beam going transversely at the top of the column, there was a shelf. On the shelf, two shelves registered an upturned U-casting which went over the beam. At the top of that U, there was a spigot or a little upstand which acted as a locater for the whole in the bottom of cast iron column above as well to rest and locate. So it registered on page 102 the top of the U and was located by the spigot upstand. Q. So on the columns, in effect, rested these, I think you called them transverse double beams and by that, as you describe in your report, there were actually two beams bolted together? A. Correct, yes. Q. I assume for extra strength? A. Yes, to give the strength they wanted, yes. Q. These ran transversely across the building as we know it to have been oriented from roughly north-south? A. That's correct. Q. They rested on the top of the column? A. Yes. Q. And on top of the beam was this upturned saddle with the spigot or little upstand above which was then the location for the column holding up the next floor; is that right? A. That rested on the top of the column below. Q. Yes. A. Yes, on the little shelf units that we were describing there. Q. The transverse beams which are relatively solid -- you mention the dimensions in the report -- what was above the transverse beams? A. On the transverse beams there are what could be called page 103 floor joists spanning this way, so spanning from floor joist to floor joist, and at the end it appeared, difficult to see the evidence, but it appeared as if there was floor joists there rested in the end walls. There was no evidence at the far end because it wasn't there simply but there's no evidence of any transverse beam where the floor joists might have rested. So it appears as if they probably rested in the wall itself. Q. So going longitudinally that is east-west orientation, between each of the main transverse beams was suspended a joist at right angles? A. It was more resting on top but locating in a little niche, if you like, taken out. So there was a niche taken out of the transverse beams at the centres where the floor joist rested. So, again, it was a location resting for the floor joist and on top of that then there was the floor covering. Q. I will come to that in a second if I may. These floor joists were not in any sense a continuous piece of wood from one end of the building to the other. They were individual joists between each of the transverse beams? A. That is how they appeared to be, yes. Q. As you explained a few moments ago at the gable wall end, at the east presumably and the west, they were probably located into the brickwork? page 104 A. It seems so and resting on the brick as were -- these transverse beams appear to be resting in the walls either side or had been resting in the walls either side. Q. Thank you very much. Then as you say, the floor was presumably a plank floor, at least a wood floor at least originally again at right angles -- A. It would appear to have been a tongue and groove floor but it appeared to be altered over the years but difficult to say. Q. Again at right angles to the joist in the normal way? A. So the tongue and groove boarding would have gone that way (indicated). Q. Where the upright columns connected to the transverse beams and where the upturned saddle provided the location for the column above, was there any form of fixing or bolting or anything through the saddle to secure it to the wood or to the column below? A. I found no evidence of any positive fixings at all at this level, at this level or this level (indicated), but at this level (indicated) which had become the flat roof, there there was provision for two bolts per column head into that longitudinal beam going that way. There weren't bolts at every location but they may have come out during the incident, during the collapse. But there page 105 had been. So I found no evidence of any positive fixings below that level but there were some at that level (indicated). Q. Thank you very much. The arrangement that you have just described, which in a sense is the holding up of the first floor, at the bottom of the columns on the ground floor towards the east of the building they were, what, directly above ground level because the building was resting on the ground at that point; is that right? A. Yes. I gather they were on masonry columns, I think. Q. Then towards the west end where we know it sloped away and there was a basement, there was an arrangement which we have seen described earlier in the basement below which then held up the column above? A. Yes, so I gather, yes. Q. Leaving aside the specialties about the ground level, the arrangement that you have just described was exactly the same on the first floor holding up the first floor ceiling and the second-floor floor? A. Yes. Q. Exactly the same at second floor level holding up the second floor ceiling and the third-floor floor; above that the columns were the same but, as you described it, and perhaps because the roof had been replaced with a flat roof, the arrangement of the top of the columns on page 106 the third floor was slightly different. Is that right? A. That is right. Could I just add that the columns were of different sizes, as you would expect, the further up they tended to be smaller diameter is what you would expect because they are carrying less load. Yes. So there wasn't a saddle for the top. It was actually a casting, the top of these columns with these two holes to allow fixings directly into that longitudinal spine timber beam. Q. On that the third floor level at the roof level there was, in fact, a longitudinal beam running least-west? A. Yes, that's true. Q. That was what was supported immediately by the columns? A. Yes. Q. Then as the model seems to suggest, the more detailed support of the flat roof structure was a series of smaller transverse beams; is that right? A. Yes, that's true and connected with -- well, resting on, according to the model, but appeared to be resting on because that had disappeared by the time I got involved but, yes, they would be resting on the longitudinal spine beam. Q. Thank you very much. Obviously, there were those fixings at the roof level but, as you have explained, no fixings at top and page 107 bottom of columns on the levels below as I think you have described quite clearly in your report, in a sense the structure depended upon gravity? A. Exactly. So they were gravity fixings if you want to use that term but held there by gravity and location devices such as the spigot. Q. Thank you very much for that, Mr Neale. I think you can return. Now, I am not going to go through the report, as I say, in detail. You have explained very helpfully just what the particular features were. In section 3.3, page 23 you refer to the ability of the structure to resist progressive collapse and you refer to the proportionate collapse and disproportionate collapse. I am not going to ask you any questions about regulations but you have referred later in your report to a regulation which refers to disproportionate collapse. Just in layman's terms what is the difference between proportionate collapse and disproportionate collapse? A. Basically disproportionate collapse is a term that is used to describe the collapse or partial collapse of a structure or building where an initiating event (and I will give an example in a moment, if I may) is seen to be quite small compared with the degree of the collapse. page 108 So if one column in a building is taken out for a reason (maybe a forklift truck hits it or something like that), it would be considered disproportionate if a large extent of the building collapsed and it wasn't, the collapse wasn't contained if there was a collapse, close to the point of impact, for example. Q. But obviously conceptually what that depends upon is the nature and severity of, as it were, the original trauma? A. Yes. Q. Because clearly, as you said by way of example, a building in which a single column is dislodged, for example, by being knocked out by a forklift truck should then not collapse to any significant extent, if at all, and if it did so that would be a disproportionate collapse? A. Yes. Q. But clearly if the event which triggered the sequence of events was a very much more serious trauma to the building, then of course something might be a proportionate collapse even if it had very significant consequences because the initial event was so significant. Is that fair? A. That's right: so its still significant of the magnitude of the event, that's right. Q. Would you go, please, to page 29 of your report. Again, page 109 I am not repeating the section before which deals with various alterations which took place to the building over the years the, addition of stair towers, the bricking up of windows and other things which are referred to. But I just want you to confirm, as you say toward the bottom of page 29 and it is confirmed elsewhere, is that the alterations which are known about to the main part of the structure may have weakened the building to some extent but not significantly in relation to this event. That is to say the explosion which occurred. So, in other words, although there had been alterations, although they might be said to have had an effect as you have described, the existence and nature of the alterations were not critical insofar as what occurred? A. Yes, that's basically it. Having seen the evidence that was available to me in terms of alterations and in relationship to the magnitude of the event that occurred on the basis of probabilities not a significant effect. Q. Page 31, please. This is in the context of life experience of the building before the event. You talk about work activities and you refer to use of equipment, forklifts in particular, iron columns and so on and in the final paragraph you say: page 110 "There was no evidence made available which indicated that the building had suffered damage directly from these operational processes, or from the building and demolition processes that led to material changes in the structure of the building. The writer is not aware however that there was damage either to columns or to walls, nor that protective measures against impact had been installed." In other words, again having investigated the possibility that there was some pre-existing defect caused by an earlier accident, you have not identified any such thing? A. Which earlier accident, sorry? I am not sure I am familiar ... just to make sure I am clear. Q. Before the events of 11th May you investigated to see if the building was in a weakened state because of some earlier accident or event and you found none. A. That's true, that's true, yes. Q. You then in section 6, beginning at page 33, deal with post event damage to the buildings and of course this is where you address the events which occurred and the consequences at the buildings. In chapter 7 you look at the -- I just wanted you to summarise. At the end of section 5 on page 32 you have also dealt with building materials and components. You page 111 say: "To summarise on the condition of materials observed at Brown Street [the police depot where the evidence was taken to] and notwithstanding the comments made in 5.2 [and that is in relation to work activities] it was noted that in general there was very little age and use-related deterioration or degradation observable." A. Those were my observations. Q. Is it fair to say, Mr Neale, subject to the limitations brought about by the structure of the building that you have demonstrated and referred to later, there was nothing about the condition of the building, its previous history, its use, that suggested a contribution to the collapse which occurred? A. No, that's correct. I mean, there may have been minor issues but substantially that's correct. Q. Thank you very much. In chapter 7, beginning at page 37, you deal with the collapse mechanisms which are considered and we can see those for ourselves. In section 8 you deal with overpressures, structural effects. Could I just ask you to look at page 42, please. In the section beginning just at the bottom of the previous page you were discussing the nature of the steel floor, the checker plate floor which was above the basement, page 112 and how it had come to rest and, as I understand it, this is the basis of the conclusion which was described also by Mr Hawksworth when he gave evidence of all of the investigations which took place. This was the basis of the conclusion: that there had been an explosion in the basement which had created overpressure which pushed the checker plate floor upwards, the checker plate floor was rather better secured at the east end than the west end so it moved upwards toward the east and overpressure then vented out towards the south and perhaps slightly to the west of the building and then leading to the other consequences as a result of dislodging of columns and so on that led to the collapse. Is that right? A. Yes. I went to Buxton and saw the checker plates that they had recovered and the distortion in the plates was consistent with that conclusion. Having said that, Dr Hawksworth undertook an in-depth investigation as I think as has been presented. Q. Indeed he also had access to specialist reports which had calculated the level of overpressure by reference to the damage to the floor and so on, all of which he said was consistent. But as far as you are concerned, having regard to your specialty in the collapse of the building that then occurred you likewise found the way in which page 113 that floor in particular was oriented and disturbed as demonstrating that? A. Yes, the visual observations that I made were consistent with that, yes. Q. You then go through the various elements of the structure and again I am happy for the Inquiry to take these matters as read. The possible failure mechanisms. Then on page 49 you ask a question, this is in section 8.4, was the damage disproportionate to the event? Of course I have already asked you certain questions about what is proportionate and what is disproportionate collapse; so it is in that context. What is your conclusion about that, Mr Neale, if you can just summarise it, please. A. My opinion is bearing in mind the magnitude of the event and the amount of lack of tying in in the structure itself, it wasn't disproportionate. The collapse was not disproportionate. Q. That might seem counter-intuitive given the very serious consequences of the collapse of the entire building with people in it but nevertheless because of the structure as you have identified it on the evidence and because of the nature of the explosion and the consequences of that, what you are saying is that actually that building in that state could not resist the events any further page 114 than it did? A. Yes, it was a reasonable sort of expectation, if you like, that that magnitude of explosion and that construction detail of the building that that sort of collapse could well occur and that is how -- the definition of it. If I may add one thing: when we talk about disproportionate collapse, it is in terms of design normally and design objectives to minimise collapse so it's not disproportionate and that is where that comes from as an initial concept. MR MARTIN: Just to focus on this and again I emphasise I am not asking you to go into any great detailed consideration of regulations and so on, if you go to page 53, please, this is in the context of the 2005 Technical Handbook on Structural Safety for Non-Domestic Premises, part 1, which you described in your evidence. Under the heading 1.2 "Mandatory" you quote the requirement: "Every building must be designed and constructed in such a way that in the event of damage occurring to any part of the structure of the building the extent of any resultant collapse will not be disproportionate to the original cause." I think we can leave that in the context of what you page 115 have said about proportionate and disproportionate collapse. You then deal with various considerations and in chapter 11 at the beginning of page 58 you set out your conclusions about the various elements and I do not think I need to take time looking at these. Thank you very much indeed for your evidence. It may be that others will wish to ask you questions. THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Neale, there is just one small point. I think the checker floor plate was better secured at the east end; is that right? A. Apparently so. I was told that because when I saw the checker plate it was -- all the ones I saw were at Buxton so I can't give you direct evidence about that, I'm afraid. THE CHAIRMAN: So the east end, would be that side of it? A. That's right. THE CHAIRMAN: The far side from where you are sitting. So would that mean that the weaker end would be the west end? It would be the end that would rise up when the explosion happened; is that right? A. That is my understanding, principally from having read Stuart Hawksworth's evidence, that is probably where the floor probably vented first so I understand and looking at the plates as they were presented, what I saw was page 116 consistent with that. THE CHAIRMAN: I just noticed on the LiveNote that it said it went upwards at the east end but that must be the west end. A. Oh I see, right. THE CHAIRMAN: So really what it all boils down to is that just the sheer scale of this event was such that the building never stood a chance, really; is that right? A. I think that's probably a fair comment. When it was -- well, I say designed, it wouldn't have been designed as we design buildings these days but when it was built it was built for gravity basically to keep it together, maybe a little bit of friction but basically gravity, so it wasn't designed to take any internal positive pressure or very little, really. I mean, I use "design" really loosely, if I may there, yes, because of the discontinuity at the connections through the building. THE CHAIRMAN: The point that occurs to me in all this is that if you have a building that was designed when the mode of power, I suppose, must have been water in the early stage and then a century later you introduce gas as a fuel, then suddenly what may have been an adequacy of design originally has to be reconsidered; is that right? A. It does seem a reasonable assumption, doesn't it? I page 117 think there's two ways of looking at it: management of the building, the structure and what uses it has, so it all comes together I would have thought, yes. THE CHAIRMAN: It is an aspect of this case that has not really been explored in any depth but my impression is that when the introduction of the LPG took place, we know that the ovens were put in in fairly modern times then. It would appear that no thought was then given to what the potential consequences could be for the design and structure of the building? A. I can't answer that, I'm afraid. I don't know what happened at that time. THE CHAIRMAN: But from your experience, would that occasion you any surprise or is it just in those days these matters were not thought of? A. I would have thought it would have been reasonable to consider what uses the building has and what fuels are in the building -- at least consider it perhaps, yes. THE CHAIRMAN: I do not think there are any questions for Mr Neale. Thank you very much for your evidence, Mr Neale. MR MARTIN: My Lord, I do apologise I wonder if I might just clarify one matter in case it was my fault in the question I asked, your Lordship's noting on the LiveNote the difference between east and west and if I page 118 was responsible for that I apologise because, as far as I understand it, Mr Neale, it is perfectly clear not just from your own evidence but from what you have heard from others, including Dr Hawksworth and the other research that he did, that what is believed to have occurred is that as a result of the overpressure the checker plate floor was forced upwards but because it appears to have been better secured at the east end rather than at the west end, it came up at an angle, as it were, pivoting towards the east end. We have actually seen photographs of this on the site which I am sure you have in the past also. Is that what you are saying just to be quite clear? A. I'm not sure the fixings on the east end -- what there was that the checker plate floor was of course built around the cast iron columns and what I'm not aware of is how much resistance there was whilst the checker plate was being blown up, how it affected the columns and it might have been caught on the columns, for example. But, yes, from the photographs it did appear that for whatever reason part of the floor near the western end came up and lodged there, I think really is the point, isn't it? In all these things you can't tell exactly what happened because so much goes on in a very quick time page 119 and sometimes structures restore themselves to a position different from the one that they've actually been in during the actual event. Q. Of course what that meant was that the escape of the overpressure then, if that is the hypothesis that actually occurred, the escape of the overpressure was then directly against the external wall over on the south and west corners of the building? A. That seems to be the case, yes. MR MARTIN: Thank you very much indeed, Mr Neale. (The witness withdrew) MR MARTIN: My Lord, I will return to Mr Shuttleworth's evidence if I may. ROB SHUTTLEWORTH (continued) Q. Just when you are ready, please, if you have the same documents to hand, please. A. Yes. Q. I think we were at what is page 8 of 10 of the UKLPG response to requests. A. Mm-hm. Q. I was asking you certain questions about your responses to I think 53 and 54. In the second paragraph of 54 you say: "Separating responsibilities would, in our view, only cause greater confusion, not less, and lead to page 120 contractual difficulties between the LPG supplier and his customer." Now, in the context of what we discussed before lunch, is that really going to be the case? Is it not rather more the practical consequences of the supplier potentially taking over service pipework and his inability physically to control it which is the problem rather than contractual difficulties? A. I think it's fair to say it's practical issues but I think our thinking was different environment with a number of other hazardous products and one is the responsibility of the supplier but the other is the responsibility of the operator. There could be confusion there. Q. I understand that. So in the context where the Health and Safety at Work regime applies more generally to a whole lot of different things then if one is excluded that is the difficulty that might arise? A. That was our thinking there but I think there are practical issues too, as already discussed. Q. In paragraph 55 you are addressing the potential extension of the Gas Safety Installation and Use Regulations to the industrial supply situation. Just before I ask you about that, at the beginning of the third paragraph of your response you say: page 121 "Currently it is our understanding that gas suppliers take responsibility for the installation and maintain ownership up to the first stage regulator." I think during the course of Phase 1 of this Inquiry, that appeared to be the position. It was certainly the evidence from witnesses at that stage from J Gas, Mr Elliott in particular who has given evidence again today. It obviously is the UKLPG understanding. What we learned yesterday from Calor at least in relation to a modern installation and their 2006 and 2007 commercial gas order document, is that they retain ownership only up to the vapour offtake valve. To what extent did UKLPG know that until yesterday? A. Well, in this reply, I wasn't aware of it certainly until yesterday. I can't answer for Mr Watson, but it was a joint reply and our assumption was the first stage regulator was generally -- whether it was into the first stage regulator or at the first stage regulator, the point of division. Q. I am not criticising you for that, Mr Shuttleworth, because I suspect you are not alone in that but does it surprise you given that the focus of this Inquiry is about uncertainties in the regime that a large operator like Calor has had for some time a different position to what the Association believe it to be, never mind what page 122 its competitors were doing? A. Well, indeed and I think it may be that we need to find out from other gas suppliers where the boundary lies because it may be -- there may be a range of different places. Q. It is not a criticism but you proceeded on the assumption that I suspect is what we all thought and you may want to look into that. But at the very least does it suggest that, whatever else happens, whether you make any substantial change to the responsibility of the service pipework, there ought to be a universal expectation of where the division is in every case, whoever is the supplier? A. I think there would be merit in having it standardised. Q. Is that something the UKLPG is likely to take on in light of what has happened at this Inquiry? A. Yes. Q. Thank you very much. Going to the substance of the question, the incorporation of the Gas Safety Installation and Use Regulations to the non-domestic, at least to industrial ... forgive me for a second, I am just trying to find the actual question that you were asked. "What are the pros and cons in UKLPG's view as to the LPG supplier to be responsible for the tank and all page 123 LPG pipework up to ..." and so on. You then refer to the Gas Safety Installation and Use Regulations placing duty on the LPG supplier to make safe in the event of reported leakage but not to repair." That of course we know about. What is the UKLPG's view about the extension of the GSIUR to industrial type situations and you may want to make a distinction, because we have heard about it earlier, between liquid phase pipework and vapour phase pipework? A. If we're talking about vapour phase pipework, I think we refer to it later but Mr Watson, who is more of an expert than I am on this, thinks the obligation can be met under PEWPR but, however, as an Association we don't have any particular issue if GSIUR was extended and therefore allowing competent people to install pipework in a factory situation. Q. That is extremely helpful because, as I said, I am not anxious to bring Mr Watson to the Inquiry if it can be avoided. Your belief within the extent of what you just said is the UKLPG would not have a particular problem about the extension of GSIUR to industrial situations of vapour phase pipework? page 124 A. No. Q. So far as the practicalities of that are concerned, and we have heard evidence about what appear to be anomalies in the accreditation of equivalent engineers doing similar tasks but in different environments, whether it is domestic, industrial, whether it is LPG or natural gas, what is your view of the practicability of extending GSIUR to industrial in terms of there being sufficiency of qualified people to implement it? A. It seems to me, as I heard the evidence from Calor over the last couple of days, and if there was a means to extend the competency of natural gas pipework fitters to LPG in a manner that satisfied safety and competency criteria to do that easily, then that would obviously increase the number of people available to carry out the work. Q. So do you think that with a reasonable level of co-operation, in practical terms, the coverage of industrial as well as domestic by GSIUR could be achieved? A. Yes. Q. We also know of course that the Health & Safety Executive is, in effect, bringing about the end of the existing CORGI regime -- and no doubt we will hear more about this -- and has entered into an arrangement with page 125 Capita who are devising their own accreditation scheme. Does that actually appear to provide an opportunity for this to be done rather than create a difficulty, because presumably if people are looking again at accreditation regimes then this, in practical terms, sounds as if it could be achieved? A. I agree. I think it is an opportunity. Q. Do you have any particular evidence about what you expect to happen when Capita arrangements come in to replace the existing CORGI accreditation? A. I don't. At this stage. We have a meeting scheduled with Capita. Q. You are at an early stage? A. Yes. Q. The questions on the following page are, in a sense, about the GSIUR regime which I do not think I need to ask you about that. Paragraph 64, the last question on the last page, just in the context of this you say in the third paragraph: "The concept of competent persons does not exist in GSIUR", and I think technically that is perfectly correct but assuming a definition which referred to an appropriate qualification, whether it was CORGI or one of its equivalents or successor does not matter. Would page 126 the creation of a concept of competent persons, however they were described, not be difficult to achieve? A. I can't imagine it would be difficult to achieve. Q. Thank you very much. At the very last sentence you say: "It is not clear that there would be a sufficient number of appropriately accredited CORGI or successor installers to inspect vapour phase pipework." Am I right that having heard the evidence of Calor you are now perhaps not as pessimistic about that? A. Well, there are clearly routes to find more, if that can be addressed. Q. Now the next matter that I would like to ask you about is the supplementary statement that you prepared with Mr Watson and I wonder if I could just ask you to look at various at aspects of that, please. The first is beginning at paragraph 9 under the heading of "Risk matrix replacement programme". Of course what you have done to assist the Inquiry, Mr Shuttleworth, is you have provided at the end of this document an extract from a part of your UKLPG letter of 19th September 2008. Is that right? A. That's correct. Q. To whom was that letter addressed? A. That letter was sent to the Inquiry team. page 127 Q. I am sorry I misread that. I thought that was a letter you sent to others that you were providing a copy of. But that was a letter directed to the Inquiry? A. Yes. Q. It begins, my Lord, at page S0906. Could you then, please, not least because of the discussion we had this morning about the various different initiatives which seem to have been taken, first Mr Tomlin, the Calor exercise; secondly, the HSL soil migration exercise; and, third, what work is being done between UKLPG and Health & Safety Executive. By reference to what you said here, if appropriate, Mr Shuttleworth, but in a little more detail if you can, could you, please, just explain exactly, putting it colloquially, what is going on in this matter? A. We set it out sequentially here and there are a number of different angles to it. It may be better to take each separate aspect whichever -- Q. Yes. Please do it the way which would suite you best. A. One is about communication, initially after the ICL incident the HSE asked the industry to distribute its leaflet "Checking LPG pipework", and approximately 60,000 to 70,000 leaflets were distributed by oil gas companies, 65,000 leaflets, to all those with vapour offtake installations and that was distributed in 2006. page 128 In terms of communication we produced a draft gas safety card which was distributed in spring of this year to all our members to communicate to their customers, covering both commercial and domestic customers and covering aspects of gas safety, including physical safety and carbon monoxide safety. So that is in terms of distribution of information. The second one is ascertaining the number of locations with metallic pipework or some aspect of metallic pipework and a desktop exercise was undertaken by suppliers in the latter part of 2007 with us getting the results in early 2008 and as I indicated earlier that suggested 30 per cent of domestic properties had at least a metallic riser but from the evidence we saw from, I think it was Mr Tomlin a large proportion of those probably would have PE pipework connecting the metallic risers. Since then we have asked all member companies to physically survey by their drivers when they visit so they can actually have the specific location identified and also ascertain the numbers as part of the exercise so that when we talk about the priority to replace, we will know which locations have metallic pipework. I think the issue of uncertainty arises because, I think it was explaining by Mr Elliott earlier, that when page 129 one company obtains the business that was previously supplied by another company, they replace the tank but not the pipework so the documents may refer to the tank and not the pipework, so this physical survey, we thought, was the best way to get absolutely to bottom of this. We have asked for that result in early 2009. The third aspect is actually the work which will help us form the risk matrix and Mr Tomlin shared an earlier version of his research with us this year and then we have shared that with the HSE and we have meetings with HSE since 2006 on developing the best way of replacing metallic pipework and how to ascertain those at most risk. Currently research is taking place at the moment, I believe, certainly been taking place over the last month I think it had been hoped the research would have been ready by now. I think there were some difficulties at the research laboratory into the behaviour of LPG from a leaking pipe and to see if it mirrors the Calor model and the Advantica model which will enable the HSE to purchase the Advantica model on how gas behaves, which will be a shortcut route to saying these are the places most at risk. I think Mr Tomlin shared the issues around soil types, one being the effect on the pipe and the other page 130 being how gas migrates within that. We have a meeting scheduled for next Monday with our technical safety management team, key members of the Board who supply gas and the HSE to take that to its next stage. Q. This is quite important to the Inquiry, Mr Shuttleworth, so forgive me if I labour it so I certainly understand it and I hope it might assist others. From the UKLPG direct involvement point of view, you have initiated an exercise whereby all of your members will obtain information by way of survey, inspection, whatever, of all of the installations for which the member is responsible, provide that to the UKLPG and you will then collate it and no doubt draw certain conclusions from it about what types of installation and perhaps which locations are the highest priority? A. Yes. Q. Is that right? A. That's correct. Q. You anticipate and have asked for the information to be provided by your members by about the early part of 2009? A. That's correct. Q. Do you have any idea of when the results of that will be in a form to be able to used for the next stage of assessment? page 131 A. I don't at this stage. It's a matter of that information coming in and I think in parallel we are actually working on what constitutes the elements of the risk, what are the risk factors and that will started certainly at the meeting on Monday to debate which are the risk factors and which are the most significant risk factors and we would like to put the two together I would hope by spring next year but it might be earlier. It depends on how quickly we get the results. It is a high priority to do. Q. Thank you. At the same time of course Mr Tomlin and Advantica had initiated its work. You became aware of it earlier this year? A. Yes. Q. You are evaluating that and no doubt taking into account what it can do to refine the work that you are already doing through your members to identify the highest risk priorities? A. Yes, but we are working together on this. Q. And you may well -- did I understand UKLPG may well purchase the -- A. The HSE will purchase the Advantica model, is my understanding. Q. In any event that then will become available to the page 132 industry as a whole? A. That's correct. Q. As far as the HSL work on soil propagation is concerned, that in effect is a verification of what Mr Tomlin has done; is that right? A. That's my understanding, yes. Q. So, in other words, that no doubt will allow the HSE to decide in due course whether or not Mr Tomlin's approach is verified? A. Indeed. Q. Which will feed of course into the ultimate designing of whatever is the strategy at the end of the development? A. That's correct. Q. Does that mean then, Mr Shuttleworth, that as far as UKLPG is concerned, and of course your members are involved both through the Association and certain, particularly Calor, are involved in specific work that is being done, by some point in the future you expect to have a strategy for identifying the highest priority of at risk pipework which will lead to implementation, removal, discontinuation of that pipework, replacement and a gradual programme which will, I assume, sooner or later work through the system and have every installation converted to PE pipework? A. So long as PE is suitable pipework for that page 133 installation, that is our intent, yes. Q. At the very least if there was a particular reason why PE was not suitable no doubt, having regard to the examination of the installation in question, appropriate alternative precautions would be taken into account? A. That would be my understanding, yes. Q. It may be difficult for you to say: do you know when it is likely that that final refined strategy, taking into account all of the elements, is likely to be in existence? A. I can't say. As I said, we've got a meeting on Monday where we will start that process which will involve both elements of the matrix. I imagine we will discuss timescales too but at this stage I can't say. Could I add though that when we have our results in the early part of next year we agreed that we would communicate with customers most at risk but we will supply that data to the HSE for them to work with the duty holders and hope to replace the underground service pipework. So what we are saying, those we identified in a commercial area most at risk by next year the HSE will have that information and be able to go and talk a directly to the duty holder and we will be communicating at the same time. Q. So strategy with reasonably expectation in existence by page 134 some time during 2009? A. Yes. Q. Is that fair? A. I think that's fair. Q. Any idea how long it will take, both in the sense of addressing the highest risk installations which are identified and working through ultimately to achieving complete replacement? A. I can't say at this stage. A lot depends on the numbers and clearly we've talked about the resource issue. How far that is progressed by Capita and CORGI in the meantime and what the actual numbers actually are. So it's hard for me to say what that would be. Q. In the next section of the supplementary statement you deal with the legislative framework. Forgive me, before I go on to that, what I have just been asking about, I think, is fairly important for the purposes of the Inquiry. Is there anything you feel that Mr Watson would be able to add to what you have said and something which only he can provide to the Inquiry? A. So far as the risk matrix programme is, no I don't believe there is anything in particular. Q. You then in the next section deal with the legislative framework. I think this is in the context of the GSIUR page 135 and we see in paragraph 14 Mr Watson's view that: "The GSIUR should be extended only up to the emergency valve. Once past this point there are problems as the regulations are written for domestic premises and factories were excluded. In some ways GSIUR is weaker than the current legislation." That is, I assume, is the factories health and safety at work legislation. Do you want to add anything to what you said earlier about the extension of the GSIUR and should it be only up to the first stage regulator, sorry the emergency control valve? A. We think it should be to the emergency control valve so it covers, in effect, service pipework. Q. I think it is fair to say, Mr Shuttleworth, nobody is actually suggesting it should go beyond -- A. I was going to say, I think that has been covered already. Then there's nothing further to add to that. Q. Codes of Practice and reference to HS(G)34. I do not think I need to ask you any questions about that. The division of Code of Practice 22 and as you confirmed this morning the document is before the Inquiry. I think it is at a relatively early stage, from what we discussed; is that right? A. It will be going out for consultation within the next page 136 month or so. It's ready to go for consultation. The document you have in front of you is the basis for consultation. So as I said, our aim is to have it out by early summer next year. Q. You mean have -- A. The final version published. Q. Is there anything in it in particular which you take note of? Because you have very helpfully provided a version of the document and a summary of the principal changes between it and the previous version. Is there anything you want to refer to as being most relevant to the proceedings of this Inquiry? A. I think there were two aspects that certainly Mr Watson drew to my attention. One was that we now say that you should ensure the pipe enters the building above ground and there should be an emergency control valve on all installations at the point of entry to the building and it is the word "should" that has now been put in as opposed to a recommendation before. Q. That would be consistent in practical terms with all the things we have talked about -- A. Yes. Q. -- and other members of the industry have given evidence about. Thank you very much. We then come to Mr Sylvester-Evans' recommendations page 137 and without asking you to look in detail at what you have said but please refer to i. Could you have available his report, please. The recommendations begin at page 53. I wonder if you would not mind, I will just go through them and please add anything. It would be very helpful to the Inquiry to have a clear confirmation of the position, as with others from the UKLPG. The first is: "Wherever possible the number of interfaces between responsible parties should be reduced to the minimum so that they can be managed actively." Do you have any disagreement with that? A. No. Q. 2, reading short: "Each party has a clear account of things like legal title, legal responsibilities, a diagram created and maintained in an accessible location and a clear account of the responsibilities and accountabilities of each party." That, in effect, is part of what is ultimately referred to as the safety dossier. Do you have any difficulty about that? A. No. Q. Is that something which either the currently proposed page 138 CoP 22 is providing for or could a revised version of a Code of Practice provide for that? A. Well, the current practice focuses on the pipework itself rather than the parties. So it would need an addendum to it if we were to go down that road. Q. It is the sort of thing, at least so far as the UK UKLPG members are concerned, could be created under directions given by a Code of Practice? A. Yes. Q. That is item 3, UKLPG should prepare guidance on this. I think you would not argue with that? A. No, we wouldn't. Q. 4: "The LPG user and, if relevant, the landowner/managing operator should be required to retain relevant up-to-date information on its system", again, by reference to various elements, ultimately being held on site in the safety dossier and I will assume as before you are entirely in support of that. A. Yes. Q. 5: "Every party who is responsible for buried metallic LPG pipework should develop an inspection and maintenance strategy which evaluates the condition of the pipework ..." and so on. page 139 I am not going to ask you about cathodic protection. We will hear about that from another witness. So far as the developing of an inspection and maintenance strategy is concerned, I would be right in assuming that once the strategy that is being followed by UKLPG in consultation with all the various other parties, once it is put into effect, a little bit like what J Gas is already doing, it will have the same result because each installation on a prioritised basis will be inspected and those which require something to be done with them will have that brought to the customer's attention? A. That is correct. Q. So, in other words, although the customer under the UKLPG model may retain legal responsibility for the service pipework, nevertheless by means of what members of the UKLPG are required to do, the customer will or the pipework itself will be subject to an appropriate examination? A. Yes. I mean, I would imagine if we have the high risk installations we would be advising customers they need to be replaced straight away. There will be others that will still retain metallic pipework for some time so it would be sensible to have this inspection and maintenance regime. page 140 Q. Mr Sylvester-Evans, in a sense, was imposing a maintenance regime on the person having responsibility for the pipework and if that happened to be the customer, which is the model supported by UKLPG and others, then it implies that the customer should create that regime. But in practical terms what UKLPG would be doing would be having the same effect? A. Well, in terms of the member companies going to them to advise they need to replace, there will cease to be this onerous inspection regime because there would be PE in place, but where there is a time lag between advice and when it is likely to be replaced based on assessed risk, it is sensible they are aware of what their responsibilities are as regards that pipework. Q. Indeed. Could that be part of bringing to the customer's attention the fact that he has that risk pipework? A. I think it can be and I think it fits in with proposal 2 and 4 above. Q. 6: "A certification or verification scheme be introduced that requires an independent competent person to verify the integrity of the LPG system prior to the LPG supplier being permitted to supply or continue to supply LPG to that site. Site verification would have to be page 141 renewed periodically at a prescribed frequency to be determined." What is the UKLPG attitude to that? A. Can I just explain what I did. After receiving Mr Sylvester-Evans' report we asked if our board members with a gas interest could have sight of this report and I asked them, in the limited time available, to indicate those proposals they either broadly agreed or fully agreed with and those they totally disagreed or broadly disagree with or were neutral. But I haven't got all the commentary as to why. I can tell you so far as this proposal is concerned the industry tends to disagreement on it. What I would like to do -- there's one further down the page they disagree with too and one where there's a range of views. We could look at other ones in detail. I would like to go back to my board members and submit a commentary as to the position because, apart from Calor's submitted document and I believe Shell have submitted a briefer document, I don't have any commentary to back up the position as the members see it. But I can tell you that there is generally disagreement with this. I know Calor suggested it could be addressed under GSIUR but I would like to get the views of other board members if they support the Calor page 142 rationale or if they have other reasons. Q. I was going to ask you at the end more generally, Mr Shuttleworth, about that very fact that obviously different members may have different views on a whole range of the matters we have discussed. May I just confirm that you will draw to our attention where there is such a difference of opinion as you have just done -- A. I will. Q. -- but, for example, in the context of the strategy you are talking about for surveying and identifying high risk pipes, may we take it that up to now there is no difference of opinion over the principle of that, that is being done already? A. There is no difference of opinion. It is being done by all member companies. Q. Obviously in the context of item 6, as Mr Sylvester-Evans explained and the reference to the renewal of verification periodically, the period may well depend upon the nature of the system. Thus if it is a fully adequate PE system installed to modern standards then the period may be relatively lengthy, whereas obviously if it is a higher risk metallic installation, even if the aspiration is to have it renewed at some point in the future, the period might be page 143 much shorter. Do you think that the fact that this might create a degree of burden upon both suppliers and customers is an influence on your members who are not so enthusiastic about it? A. I can't really say, as I said, without having a commentary. I'd prefer to go back and ask for the specific reasons why and supply that to the Inquiry. Q. 7: "Any verification scheme should be developed jointly by UKLPG with its members and HSE." I recognise you may not support it but assuming it were to happen would it be sensible if it were developed in that way? A. That's correct. Q. 8: "All existing industrial and commercial LPG facilities are inspected and upgraded to ensure ..." and, as I understand it, that is actually the thrust of what the UKLPG is doing through this strategy? A. Yes and there was agreement to that proposal. Q. 9: "UKLPG prepares practical advice for industrial/commercial LPG users on how to fulfil their page 144 statutory duties, particularly under DSEAR. This should be done in consultation with HSE." Any problem with that? A. None. The members we consulted agreed with that proposal. Q. 10, this may be one that is not directly in the interests of you and the members but: "Processes put in place to define for each LPG user site [putting it very shortly] the responsible enforcement officer." Do you have any comment on that one? A. No, we were broadly neutral on that. Q. 11: "The LPG supplier should be obliged to provide the LPG user with a summary of its asset register", and so on. Any difficulty with that? A. No. Q. 12: "LPG users should be obliged to compile a safety dossier for their LPG system." In effect, I think you have already dealt with that? A. That's support. Q. 13: "Guidance and practical template for a safety dossier should be developed by UKLPG with its members in page 145 full consultation with HSE." A. That's supported. Q. 14: "The Inquiry considers as appropriate, improving the ongoing communication from the LPG supplier to the LPG user of generic type material ... concerning safe use, legal duties, detailed guidance", and so on. Do you have any comment on that one? A. No, the members I consulted were neutral or broadly in agreement with that. Q. The second arrow point: "The formation of an LPG suppliers and users forum or similar ..." We talked about that this morning and you explained there might be more than one forum depending upon the particular sector of the market. Is there anything you want to add to that? A. No. I think there might be some practical issues to overcome but I think the industry supports the proposal. Q. 15: "HSE or whoever is responsible should publish more authoritative and detailed guidance on assessing whether existing building/structural safety is adequate and commensurate with the work place hazards and risks, such as the use of LPG." page 146 Again, it may not be of direct concern to the UKLPG itself but I take it you do not anticipate any difficulty with that? A. No difficulty with that proposal. Q. 16: "Appropriate mechanisms are put in place to collate the existing and future data on LPG incidents for the LPG supplier and LPG user to actively learn lessons ..." et cetera, "adverse trends to be identified." Any comment on that, Mr Shuttleworth? A. No, that has the full support of the people consulted. Q. To what extent have members either -- are they already doing that, providing information to UKLPG, or indicated a willingness to do so? A. We do get data. I think we can improve our collation of the data and the way we dis-aggregate it because I think as Mr Ellis explained it might cover everything from bottled gas through to bulk gas where the bottled gas may be incidental to the original incident, it includes carbon monoxide issues as well so I think we can frankly do a better job in terms of dis-aggregating our statistics to provide more use to the industry in terms of identifying any trends or issues that need addressing. page 147 Q. Do you anticipate co-operation from your membership in providing the raw information? A. Yes. I think so. I think we also need HSE input if they have data and information. I think in the end we must recognise that the first response to many incidents is to address that actual incident, which is the most important thing, and sometimes minor issues aren't reported. So there is room for improvement in that. Q. 17: "An appropriate mechanism be put in place to establish for industrial and commercial categories of bulk LPG sites ... key statistics to assist in assessing the overall risk and monitoring progress ..." Again, I understand that is exactly what you are doing? A. Yes, it's agreed. Q. 18: "During the transition phase, implement a basic risk ranking method to prioritise LPG user sites, particularly with buried metallic pipework, which are deemed especially high risk." What comment do you have on that? A. That, in effect, is what we are doing. I mean, it is the risk ranking method. I think once we have that assessed it is how we deal with the pipework, those page 148 locations where the pipework will not be replaced immediately, deemed a lower risk, to make sure they are monitored and don't become higher risk in the meantime. Q. That is, if I may say, a very fair way of putting it. In a sense 17 and 18 from the point of view of UKLPG are actually the same thing. You are obtaining a hierarchy of ranking of risk. You will target those at the highest risk, obviously what might be described as the transition phase of those not in the high risk end will be dealt with later? A. Yes. Q. In a sense the strategy, if you like, is the fact that these ones have been rated at a lower risk in the meantime? A. Indeed. Q. Is that a fair way of putting it? A. Yes, but we must make sure that if they are lower risk they aren't neglected. Q. 19: "The Inquiry considers a registration scheme be implemented by LPG suppliers." What is the attitude -- A. I can tell you there is a range of views on this from total disagreement to full agreement across the seven companies I consulted on this. page 149 Q. We happen to know, I think I am right in saying, that the two who have given evidence supported it, but I understand what you are saying. A. Indeed. I mean, again, it is one I would need to provide more commentary on. The only observation I can make is if it too onerous, does it restrict competition? On the other hand, the advantage could be that people who are competing fairly and safely are not undercut by people coming into the marketplace, who may not even be in the marketplace now, offering a less safe model, cutting costs and cutting corners. So I can see it has merit either way. I think the key to it is, if the Inquiry accepts that recommendation, that it isn't so onerous, that it doesn't damage competition in the marketplace. Q. Essentially balancing two public interest considerations. A. Absolutely, yes, and I suspect that is where the thinking has come from. Q. 20: "The Inquiry considers whether legislation is introduced whereby it would be a criminal offence to supply and use an LPG system which did not have an up-to-date verification certificate." A. Linked to number 6, I conclude the industry broadly or page 150 totally disagrees with this proposal. Again, I don't have a commentary and I would like to get that. Taking Calor's, obviously if GSIUR is extended then GSIUR provides the means by which the user is responsible. I believe one of my other members who did make a submission suggested that if a registration scheme came in or any other form of structure, that there may be an onus on the user should they fail to carry out their duties rather than on the suppliers. They did not feel the supplier should be held accountable for the failure of a user of this product. Q. Forgive me, Mr Shuttleworth, it is not really to hold the supplier accountable other than in extreme circumstances. The practical purpose of this is to discourage the filling of tanks when the system is not adequately verified. Of course there is a criminal offence which may be a sanction on a supplier if he breaches the obligation, but it is a practical purpose. What it is intended to do is to bring about what is not a complete safeguard but I think other witnesses have agreed is a reasonable consequence of the LPG system, that once your tank is empty by and large the risk begins to diminish, if not disappear completely. So not filling a system which is at risk is a safeguard. I wonder if your members have actually seen it in page 151 that way rather than simply an attempt to create a criminal offence that they might be responsible for? A. That I can't answer. They didn't have particularly long to look at this recommendation. It is this item and item 6 I would like to provide a commentary on back into the Inquiry based on the responses they have given me in this last week so I could present those responses here. THE CHAIRMAN: It seems to me, Mr Shuttleworth, that if you as an industry are selling dangerous products to the user, it is reasonable surely to expect you not to do that in a case where there is not an appropriate verification. A. I don't think the member companies anticipate that they would supply where they thought it was unsafe and I think we heard evidence from Calor and J Gas that with their contracts they wouldn't do that. As I say, all I have is a brief tick sheet in terms of their response and I would like to be able to provide a commentary as to why. I don't think there is any intent to supply an unsafe facility. I think they would see that as being done through current practice would be sufficient. THE CHAIRMAN: It is just a question of seeing where the responsibility should lie. If you are selling drink to underage people, one view is to say well, they shouldn't page 152 be asking to buy it and the other view is that the supplier of it is the person who should be criminally prosecuted if they do. Possibly not an exact analogy but ... A. I understand the point you are making. MR MARTIN: Again, I appreciate the relatively short to consider this, Mr Shuttleworth, but, as I understand it, it is not actually directly at members of UKLPG at all because it is assumed that they will act responsibly. It is to deal with a situation where you have a system where the responsible member is not prepared to fill because he regards it as being at risk and either the occupier himself, or possibly a non-member supplier who is prepared to cut corners, does fill the tank and it is really directed at these individuals rather than the responsible supplier. If you are seeking a commentary, would you be prepared to convey that to the membership as being the thrust of why this criminal offence is being suggested? A. I will do so. As I say, I do think the responsible suppliers do not think they would supply. Therefore, I will convey that intent and provide a commentary based on that intent. Q. Leaving aside technical competition matters, it is almost a safeguard to actually trying to inhibit page 153 somebody coming in and doing something they are not prepared to do? A. I think as you described it, it has merits. Q. Lastly number 21: "Inquiry considers assigning target timescales for the implementation of its recommendations." I have asked questions about timing and so on. I am not sure there is much more you can help us with that. I dare say your evidence about anticipated timescales will be reflected in the report but, from what you say, would target timescales be of assistance? Would it hope to focus your members' minds or -- A. The industry were neutral on that proposal. So yes, that's fine. Q. There are just two further matters I want to explore with you. First, you indicated that in respect of in particular two of the recommendations you would like to canvass the views of members of the UKLPG further. This Inquiry will sit to hear evidence again in two weeks -- that is to say, I think the week beginning Tuesday 8th November -- not next week but the week after. Do you think you would be in a position to provide a response by then? I am suggesting in writing, not that you would have to be here. A. Yes, I would be able to supply a response by then. page 154 Q. The second question I have to ask you is having regard to your evidence, the questions I have asked you and the matters which you have been very helpful in dealing with, do you feel that there is anything in particular that Mr Watson could say that you have not been able to say that should come before the Inquiry? A. No, I think I have covered everything he might have said in response to your questions. Q. I dare say you can think about that too and let the Inquiry team know. But I am not, my Lord, insisting on Mr Watson coming unless there is a particular reason. A. If you wanted to go into further technical detail on either the implications of any legislation or the detail of any Codes of Practice, he would be best suited to answer that. MR MARTIN: I have no further questions. Others may have. Please remain. THE CHAIRMAN: There is a question from Mrs Ferguson. MR McBREARTY: Indeed, my Lord. Examined by MR MCBREARTY Q. Mr Shuttleworth, asking a question on behalf of Mrs Ferguson -- just one question. It has been suggested by Mrs Ferguson in written submissions to the Inquiry that it might be beneficial to require the users of LPG to identify a particular page 155 individual within their organisation who would be responsible for LPG, for health and safety issues relating to it and for liaison with suppliers. With that in mind can I ask you a question in two parts. Firstly, can you indicate whether the UKLPG would be supportive of such a proposal and, secondly, if so, would you consider that it would be beneficial that such an individual would have some form of technical training in relation to LPG? A. I think I couldn't see any issue with disagreeing that there is an individual aware of the product and issues surrounding the product and its use in that particular location. I think we talked about out of sight, out of mind. I think it is more important that they know about it so they can ensure if they are not the technical specialist, they can obtain that specialist knowledge to ensure that it remains at the forefront in that particular location. So I don't know if they have to be technically competent; what they have to be is aware that that is part of their responsibilities and I think by at least being front of mind as part of their responsibilities, that is a significant leap forward in terms of keeping awareness there. So I would see no reason not to support that. page 156 Q. In general you would have no -- A. In general, but they may not be the right person in the end to talk about the detail of delivery or aspects of LPG. In larger installations, there may be a different person who takes the delivery from the people who are responsible for its use within a factory environment. I think the important bit is somebody centrally is aware of the totality of that product through the system in that place. Q. For example, it may be that that would be an appropriate person to have a responsibility for the safety dossier? A. That would seem to fit. MR McBREARTY: Thank you. Examined by MRS STACEY Q. Mr Shuttleworth, can you tell me please how the UKLPG would know whether a member company was adhering to the Articles and the Codes of Practice or not? A. We would tend to get it from complaint, either from a member of the public, the user or another member company. Q. Is there some complaint system whereby you look at complaints? A. Yes. It would generally come to me and there is a process in our Articles of Association whereby the board -- we would examine it and put it to the board who page 157 would review the complaint and the outcome with what we find in our investigation. Q. Are you able to help me as to how often any sort of sanctions do have to be applied? A. Recently I don't think there have been any sanctions but certainly in the last 20 years one member was suspended for a serious breach of safety. Q. That's one in 20 years? A. Mm-hm. MRS STACEY: Thank you Mr Shuttleworth. Nothing further, my Lord. THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Ellis. Examined by MR ELLIS Q. Mr Shuttleworth, there are just two things I would like to ask you about and both arise from your joint supplementary statement, if you could have that in front of you. First of all, at paragraph 14 of that joint statement there is a view, I think, which is expressed as the personal view of Mr Watson. A. Mm-hm. Q. Is all of paragraph 14 his personal view? A. Well, he is our technical adviser on it; so you could argue it is his personal view, but he has discussed that view with me. page 158 Q. Can I ask you about one matter and see if you can help, please, as opposed to him. At the end of paragraph 14, Mr Watson seems to be expressing the view that GSIUR would, if expanded to industrial premises, constitute a weaker regime. A. In that there is no longer any duty beyond installation under GSIUR. It is his view that PUWER both gives an ongoing duty to maintain and requires a competent person to install and a keeping of records. Q. What I was going to ask is this: can you help me on whether it should be possible to have GSIUR requirements extended to apply to the service pipes in addition to the existing statutory regimes? A. I would see that is possible. Q. If that was possible, would it be right that the end result would not weaken the regime that was applicable. A. That would be correct. Q. I wonder if I could ask you please then to look at paragraph 19. I am conscious from what you said a few moments ago that this deals with the advice that is contained within certain Codes of Practice and is Mr Watson the person I should be addressing that to? A. I think paragraph 19 I would say you would need to address that to Mr Watson. Q. Just to give you a flavour of the questions to be sure page 159 on that, a view that has been put across, I think, that HS(G)34 and the LPGA Code of Practice were not intended to apply to pipework, except in the immediate vicinity of the tank. A. As far as Code of Practice 1 is concerned, that is correct. Q. Are you in a position to explore that question? A. I can't go into detail on it in terms of the content of it, but Mr Watson would be the right person to answer questions on it. Q. So if I want to pursue why that view is formed, I would need to do that with Mr Watson? A. Yes. MR ELLIS: Thank you. No further questions. THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Macauley, do you wish to ask anything? MR MACAULEY: No. THE CHAIRMAN: Any further questions? MR MARTIN: My Lord, just before Mr Shuttleworth departed, I was just wanting to explore the consequence of my learned friend Mr Ellis' questions which brought into question the presence of Mr Watson. I wonder if it would satisfy my learned friend if Mr Watson in the first instance had the opportunity to address the question in writing to avoid having to come. It seems a pretty clear focused matter. I hope that might be page 160 possible. MR ELLIS: I would be very happy with that, my Lord, to avoid Mr Watson having to attend in person. THE CHAIRMAN: I think that can easily be sorted out. I think that concludes Mr Shuttleworth's evidence. I am very grateful to you for your help, Mr Shuttleworth, not just today but also in preparing such a helpful response from the industry. (The witness withdrew) MR MARTIN: My Lord, I think that concludes the proceedings for today. There are no other witnesses available. We will resume a week on Tuesday. The first witness I think will be Mr King. We will then have the return of Mr Betts and thereafter I think Mr Fullam, Miss Caldwell and Mr Podger in that order and then of course ultimately Mr Sylvester-Evans will return to be cross-examined and potentially to provide some additional comment on his recommendations following the evidence at that stage. THE CHAIRMAN: There is just one procedural matter. There is a direction that I have drawn up today which will be circulated to everyone. It just relates to the closing submissions, the order of submissions and the opportunity for persons other than core participants to submit written representations, if so advised, by 12th page 161 November. There is no point my reading it all out. I will just circulate it and it will go on the website. We will adjourn then if there are no other matters until a week on Tuesday. (3.47 pm) (Adjourned until Tuesday, 4th November at 10.30 am)